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INTRODUCTION 
he legal regulation of marijuana is in a state of flux in the United 
States. Over the last dozen or so years, eighteen states and the 
District of Columbia have passed measures permitting the use of 
marijuana for medical purposes; in the fall of 2012, two states—
Colorado and Washington—went a step further and decriminalized 
entirely possession of less than an ounce of the drug. At the same 
time, marijuana remains a Schedule I narcotic, a drug whose 
manufacture, possession, and distribution remain prohibited by 
federal law. This Article focuses on the ethical (and sometimes 
criminal) quandary that the tension between state and federal law in 
this area creates. As marijuana moves from the shadows to the 
storefronts, it becomes a business. Businesses have employees, 
shareholders, and creditors. They must comply with state and local 
zoning ordinances, enter into numerous contracts, and pay their taxes. 
In many businesses, proprietors turn to lawyers for help with these 
and other legal issues. Lawyers incorporate businesses, give advice 
about tax law, write leases and employment agreements, and help 
navigate the labyrinth of regulatory compliance. 
This usual relationship is necessarily complicated by the fact that 
the manufacture and sale of marijuana remains a federal offense 
T
KAMIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  9:58 AM 
2013] Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders? 871 
punishable by up to life in prison.1 While a state may choose to 
decriminalize, medicalize, or even legalize marijuana, it does not have 
the power to undo the federal criminal prohibition of the drug. Even 
in those states decriminalizing marijuana, every sale of marijuana, 
every plant that is grown, is a serious violation of federal law. Thus, 
an attorney engaged by a marijuana practitioner to do the work that 
lawyers traditionally do for businesses necessarily puts herself at risk. 
Because all lawyers have an obligation not to knowingly assist 
criminal conduct,2 attorneys who take on marijuana clients face the 
possibility of significant ethical and criminal consequences for their 
actions. 
In this Article, we discuss the ethical and criminal provisions that 
impact a lawyer’s representation of clients working in the emerging 
marijuana industry. We show that under a traditional, strict reading of 
both criminal law and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, an 
attorney is prohibited from providing most kinds of legal assistance to 
a marijuana client. However, such a reading of the rules would have 
serious negative repercussions in those states that have moved to 
decriminalize marijuana. Without the participation of attorneys, 
important state policies will be frustrated; where a state has chosen to 
regulate marijuana as medicine or to tax and regulate it like alcohol, 
lawyers are a necessary part of the implementation of these policy 
decisions. Furthermore, depriving marijuana clients access to lawyers 
undermines the core values of client autonomy and equality under the 
law. 
The ethical and lawful representation of marijuana clients is not 
without limits, however. Some of these limits are easy to define, 
while others are far more amorphous. We borrow from the law of 
accomplice and coconspirator liability to give shape to the line 
between permitted and forbidden legal help to marijuana clients. So 
long as lawyers merely know about—but do not form the intent to 
aid—marijuana clients’ violations of federal law, and as long as 
attorneys provide the same services on similar terms to marijuana 
clients as they do to other clients, they violate neither their ethical 
obligations nor the prohibitions of the criminal law.3 
Using specific examples, we give much-needed guidance to 
attorneys engaged in this emerging and problematic area of practice. 
	
1 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)–(b)(1)(A), 960(a)–(b)(1) (2006). 
2 See infra Part III. 
3 See infra Part II. 
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Our proposed reading of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), 
which prohibits assisting a client in the commission of a crime, 
establishes that lawyers may generally help marijuana clients address 
the majority of their legal needs: attorneys may defend marijuana 
clients charged with violations of the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA),4 may serve as lobbyists in challenging federal law, and may 
advise clients about state and federal marijuana law. Lawyers may 
also generally help clients with compliance work, such as filing for a 
license to own and operate a marijuana business; negotiate leases for 
commercial real estate space, out of which clients will operate a 
dispensary; and advise clients about employment matters pertaining to 
their marijuana businesses. In most instances, such conduct will not 
violate Rule 1.2(d) at all because lawyers lack the intent necessary for 
assistance of criminal activity under our proposed interpretation of 
intent. Moreover, even when a lawyer’s conduct will arguably violate 
Rule 1.2(d), we believe that she may assert a moral reason to 
nonetheless help a marijuana client, as long as she is willing to accept 
the criminal and disciplinary consequences of her conduct. 
I 
A HISTORY OF MARIJUANA IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Federal Law 
1. The Birth of Marijuana Prohibition 
Even those who continue to believe that marijuana is a pernicious 
drug5 must acknowledge that the history of its regulation in the 
United States is a sorry one. Marijuana in the early twentieth century 
was negatively associated in the popular consciousness with African-
Americans and Mexican-Americans, a fact directly tied to the initial 
movement to criminalize it.6 In large part because of these negative 
	
4 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2006). 
5 While we acknowledge that marijuana may be less dangerous than legal drugs such as 
alcohol and tobacco, we do not advocate its legalization and none of the arguments in this 
Article rely on the legalization of marijuana. 
6 See, e.g., Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 117, 119 (1992) (“The fact that marijuana use was first 
widely associated with minority groups and the jazz subculture directly influenced the 
government’s approach to the perceived problem. Mexicans, Asians, and African 
Americans were generally of lower socioeconomic standing, and were prejudicially 
perceived as criminal and violent. Marijuana was thus portrayed as fostering aggression, 
and the fear was that the ‘killer weed’ would ‘infect’ American youth, provoking them to 
crime and violence.” (citations omitted)). 
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associations, Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, 
removing the drug from the list of approved pharmaceutical 
substances.7 
Two generations later, President Nixon pushed Congress to “get 
tough” on drugs, following what many saw as the self-indulgent 
excesses of the 1960s.8 Congress responded by passing the CSA,9 the 
prevailing regulatory regime to this day. Under the CSA, marijuana is 
classified—along with heroin, LSD, MDMA, and other dangerous 
substances—as a Schedule I narcotic.10 All Schedule I narcotics are 
deemed by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to have no 
approved medical use and a high potential for abuse.11 Although 
several seemingly more dangerous substances are listed as less 
serious Schedule II drugs,12 the federal government has repeatedly 
refused to move marijuana from the list of most regulated drugs or to 
otherwise ameliorate the severity of federal marijuana laws.13 
	
7 Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 238, § 4, 50 Stat. 553, 553 (1937); see also Michael 
Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct 
Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 749 n.244 (1998) (“[P]rohibition has more to 
do with politics and racism than with [marijuana’s] diminished pharmacological 
importance.”); infra note 26 (noting the continuing racially disparate impact of marijuana 
prohibition in the United States). 
8 Michael Berkey, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal Tango, 9 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 426 (2011) (“When President Nixon took 
office in 1969, he saw this prevalent marijuana use by the nation’s youth as causing a 
moral decay in American society.”); Brooke Mascagni, The Politics of Exclusion in 
California’s Marijuana Reform Movement, 15 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 33, 35 (2011) (“The 
U.S. federal government began regulating marijuana in 1937, and in 1971, President 
Richard Nixon escalated federal prosecution of marijuana with the declaration of the War 
on Drugs.”). 
9 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, tit. 
II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2006)). 
10 21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
11 See id. § 812(b). 
12 Opium, phencyclidine (PCP), cocaine, and amphetamines are among the drugs in 
Schedule II. Other serious drugs are subject to the less restrictive regulation of Schedule 
III: ketamine, anabolic steroids, and barbiturates. 
13 In response to raids by DEA agents on medical marijuana providers in California, 
funding bills have been introduced in Congress that would forbid the use of federal funds 
to prosecute those complying with state medical marijuana provisions; these bills have 
consistently been defeated. A typical provision stated, “[n]one of the funds made available 
in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used [in certain states] to prevent such 
States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” 153 CONG. REC. H8484 (daily ed. July 
25, 2007) (the Hinchey-Rohrabacher Amendment). 
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2. DEA Regulation 
Although there is a great deal of debate regarding the 
appropriateness of the categorization of marijuana as a Schedule I 
narcotic, the power of the DEA to so categorize it and to enforce this 
categorization through civil and criminal sanctions is not in question. 
In Gonzales v. Raich, the United States Supreme Court rejected a 
Commerce Clause challenge to Congress’s power to regulate the 
intrastate cultivation and consumption of marijuana.14 Because 
intrastate marijuana production affects the interstate market for 
marijuana, the Court held it was properly the subject of Congressional 
regulation under the Interstate Commerce Clause.15 
The continued categorization of marijuana as a Schedule I narcotic 
has two primary effects. First, the manufacture and distribution of a 
Schedule I narcotic are expressly prohibited by law and are the targets 
of significant criminal and civil penalties. The punishment for 
violation of the CSA’s criminal provisions varies with the amount of 
drug involved but can be quite serious for large amounts—possession 
of 100 or more marijuana plants, for example, is punishable by up to 
forty years in a federal prison.16 The CSA also has extensive civil 
provisions, allowing for the forfeiture of property shown to have been 
used in the distribution and manufacture of a prohibited substance.17 
Furthermore, as discussed more fully below, the CSA and its 
forerunners have been influential on the passage of state laws 
prohibiting marijuana. In addition to the blanket federal prohibition of 
marijuana, the legislatures of every state have made the drug’s 
manufacture and sale a criminal offense as well.18 
	
14 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
15 Id. at 17–22. The Court distinguished its decisions in Lopez v. United States, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)—invalidating under 
the Commerce Clause the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1990, respectively—by analogizing to its long-standing decision in Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Filburn, the Court has found wheat grown on Filburn’s 
property for personal consumption was a proper subject of federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 17–26. 
16 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
17 See id. § 881. 
18 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11360 (West 2012) (“Except as otherwise 
provided by this section or as authorized by law, every person who transports, imports into 
this state, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away, or offers to transport, import into 
this state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this state or 
transport any marijuana shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of 
Section 1170 of the Penal Code for a period of two, three or four years.”). Even in 
Colorado and Washington, the production and sale outside of the regulated recreational 
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As a result of this web of state and federal laws, an enormous 
number of people have been and continue to be arrested and 
incarcerated for marijuana crimes in the United States. One study 
calculated the number of marijuana prisoners nationwide at nearly 
45,000 and the annual cost of their incarceration at more than $1 
billion.19 In 2010, more than forty-five percent of those arrested for 
drug possession in the United States were arrested for marijuana, with 
the vast majority of these arrests occurring at the state and local 
level.20 
The second major consequence of marijuana’s categorization as a 
Schedule I narcotic is the inability of DEA-certified physicians to 
prescribe the drug to patients. Because the very definition of a 
Schedule I drug is one with neither an approved medical use nor a 
safe dosage, such drugs can never be prescribed by any doctor 
licensed by the DEA. While state medical marijuana (MMJ) laws 
generally require a physician’s approval to obtain the drug, the laws 
generally frame that approval in terms of a doctor’s recommendation 
rather than a prescription.21 
B. State Regulation 
In part because of concerns about the efficacy and fairness of 
federal marijuana laws, the past several years have seen significant 
pressure to change marijuana’s continued categorization as an illicit 
	
marijuana industries remains criminal. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(4). 
(withdrawing some, but not all, cultivation, sale, and manufacture of marijuana and 
marijuana-infused products from Colorado’s criminal laws.). 
19 Paul Armentano, Pot Prisoners Cost Americans $1 Billion a Year, ALTERNET (Feb. 
9, 2007), http://www.alternet.org/rights/47815/; see also CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & 
JENNIFER C. KARBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG USE AND DEPENDENCE, STATE 
AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 2004 (2006), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf 
/dudsfp04.pdf. 
20 Crime in the United States 2010, THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/persons 
-arrested (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
21 The term “recommendation” is carefully chosen; while Congress and the DEA may 
determine what drugs may and may not be prescribed by licensed physicians, the power to 
limit what is discussed between doctors and patients is limited by the First Amendment. In 
Conant v. Walters, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a doctor could not, 
consistent with the First Amendment, be prohibited from recommending marijuana to her 
patients if she believed it was appropriate for their treatment. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 
629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002). The court relied in part on Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
the right of publicly funded doctors to discuss abortion with their clients despite a federal 
ban on the public funding of abortion. Id. at 638. 
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substance.22 Many critics of the federal prohibition believe that 
marijuana is a relatively benign substance, one that is far less harmful 
than alcohol and tobacco, both of which are legal, regulated, and 
taxed.23 Others have praised it as a powerful medicine, effective at 
treating pain, nausea, and other ailments.24 Still others see the 
underground marijuana trade as a potential source of state revenue. 
Arguing that taxing and regulating marijuana combined with an end 
to the arrest and prosecution of nonviolent marijuana offenders would 
result in a large net gain to state and federal coffers, a number of 
advocates have seen marijuana as a rare fiscal opportunity in troubled 
economic times.25 Finally, the racial disparity in the enforcement of 
marijuana laws has become difficult for many to ignore.26 
Although this growing resistance to marijuana prohibition has met 
a dead end at the federal level, the situation in the states has proven 
far more fluid. Within the last twenty years, a number of states have 
begun to decriminalize the drug, making possession of a small 
amount of marijuana a relatively minor offense under state law.27 In 
addition, many municipalities have told their law enforcement units to 
	
22 See, e.g., Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Admin., No. 11-1265 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf 
/12CBD2B55C34FBF585257AFB00554299/$file/11-1265-1416392.pdf (lawsuit by 
advocacy group challenging the DEA’s refusal to reclassify marijuana). 
23 See, e.g., About Marijuana, NORML, http://norml.org/marijuana (last visited Mar. 1, 
2013) (“Marijuana is far less dangerous than alcohol or tobacco. Around 50,000 people die 
each year from alcohol poisoning. Similarly more than 400,000 deaths each year are 
attributed to tobacco smoking. By comparison, marijuana is nontoxic and cannot cause 
death by overdose.”). 
24 See, e.g., Medical Marijuana, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/   
-marijuana/medical/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (“Numerous published studies suggest that 
marijuana has medical value in treating patients with serious illnesses such as AIDS, 
glaucoma, cancer, multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, and chronic pain. In 1999, the Institute of 
Medicine, in the most comprehensive study of medical marijuana’s efficacy to date, 
concluded, ‘Nausea, appetite loss, pain and anxiety . . . all can be mitigated by 
marijuana.’”). 
25 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INST., THE 
BUDGETARY IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION (2010), http://www.cato.org/sites 
/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf (finding that ending marijuana prohibition 
would result in more than $8 billion in additional revenue for the federal government 
annually). 
26 See, e.g., Liane Membis, Legalizing Marijuana is Civil Rights Issue, California 
NAACP Says, CNN (July 7, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-07/politics/naacp 
.marijuana.support_1_international-faith-based-coalition-bishop-ron-allen-marijuana-laws 
?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
27 See States that Have Decriminalized, NORML, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item 
/states-that-have-decriminalized (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (listing states). 
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treat the possession of marijuana as their lowest priority.28 But the 
biggest change in marijuana policy at the state level has been the 
move to legalize the drug either for medical or recreational purposes. 
The move to decriminalize the medical use of marijuana at the state 
level has proven very effective: eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia have legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes, making 
the drug available to those with a doctor’s recommendation.29 
But provision for MMJ use is inherently something of a middle 
ground. It does not do away with the prohibition entirely but merely 
provides an affirmative defense to authorized users charged with 
violating the state’s criminal law. Furthermore, in a number of states, 
there has been criticism that MMJ provisions are nothing more than a 
wink and a nod at full legalization.30 Easy access to medical 
recommendations,31 “medical” marijuana dispensaries with names 
like Dr. Reefer and Rocky Mountain High,32 and aggressive 
	
28 Phillip Smith, Feature: Lowest Law Enforcement Priority: Marijuana Initiatives 
Face the Voters in Five Cities, STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Oct. 26, 2006, 4:51 PM), 
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2006/oct/26/feature_lowest_law_enforcement_p. 
29 ALASKA STAT. Ann. § 17.37.010 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Reg. & 3d 
Special Legis. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2012); COLO. 
CONST. art. 18, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to -128 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Reg. Legis. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B (West, Westlaw through 2011 
2d Reg. Legis. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.26421–.26430 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Legis. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-101 to -344 (West, 
Westlaw through 2011 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 453A.010–.810 (West, 
Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Legis. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 legislation); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-2B-1 to -7 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 2d Reg. Legis. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300–.375 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 21-28.6-1 to -13 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Legis. Sess.); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472–41 (West, Westlaw through 2011-2012 Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 69.51A.005–.903 (West, Westlaw through 2012 legislation). 
30 Laura Cosgrove, Medical Marijuana Cards Easy to Get, Some Say; Police Focus On 
Regulating Dispensaries, Not Doctors, MERCURYNEWS.COM (June 29, 2011), http://www 
.mercurynews.com/mosaic/ci_18375000; Buck Fleming, Medical Marijuana: A Sad Joke, 
BUCK SAYS (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.bucksays.com/medical-marijuana-a-sad-joke/; 
Sherry Hewins, Medical Marijuana, Legitimate Treatment or Excuse to Get High?, HUB 
PAGES (Sept. 7, 2012), http://sherryhewins.hubpages.com/hub/Medical-Marijuana             
-Legitimate-Treatment-or-Excuse-to-Get-High. 
31 If physicians were a bit more scrupulous about their diagnosis and recommendation 
of MMJ, lawyers could perhaps rest a little easier that they were, for the most part, helping 
clients engage in genuine medical usage of marijuana. Indeed, state statutes often treat the 
need for a doctor’s recommendation or approval of the consumption of MMJ as an 
important check on the use of marijuana within the statutory scheme. See Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Medical Marijuana Laws and Medical 
Necessity Defense to Marijuana Laws, 50 A.L.R. 6th 353, §§ 2, 13–17 (2009). 
32 See William Breathes, Medical Marijuana Dispensary Review: Rocky Mountain 
High—Cherry Creek, DENVER WESTWORD (Feb. 3, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://blogs 
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advertising and marketing campaigns by MMJ dispensaries, have led 
in some places to a backlash against the MMJ industry.33 While this 
criticism led to retrenchment in some states, in others it has led to 
calls to end the medical “charade” and simply permit marijuana to be 
sold to any adult regardless of whether they have received a doctor’s 
recommendation or not.34 
The final move from MMJ to full legalization proved a difficult 
one, however. Until 2012, no state had taken the additional step of 
removing its own prohibition and sale of the drug for recreational 
purposes.35 One important reason for this reticence was the 
significant federal opposition to such a move. In 2010, when 
California considered Proposition 19, which would have legalized 
possession and manufacture of relatively large amounts of marijuana, 
Attorney General Eric Holder made clear that the federal government 
would look with extreme disapproval on any such move.36 The 
measure was polling strongly throughout the state headed into the 
	
.westword.com/latestword/2011/02/medical_marijuana_dispensary_review_rocky 
_mountain_high_cheer_creek.php; Heath Urie, “Dr. Reefer” Seeks Patient Support Ahead 
of Federal Sentencing, DAILY CAMERA (May 2, 2011, 6:07 PM), http://www.dailycamera 
.com/boulder-county-news/ci_17977095. 
33 Next Target of Federal Pot Backlash in California: Marijuana Ads, MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Oct. 12, 2011), http://mmjbusinessdaily.com/2011/10/12 
/next-phase-of-federal-pot-backlash-in-california-target-marijuana-ads/; Kristen Wyatt, 
Medical Pot Ads Bring Denver Backlash, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.pressherald.com/news/nationworld/Medical-marijuana-ads-under-attack-in      
-Denver-.html. 
34 See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Marijuana Only for the Sick? A Farce, Some Angelenos 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/us/california-fight-to 
-ensure-marijuana-goes-only-to-sick.html?ref=us&_r=0 (“Vague state laws governing 
medical marijuana have allowed recreational users of the drug to take advantage of the 
dispensaries, say supporters of the Los Angeles ban and the federal crackdown. Here on 
the boardwalk of Venice Beach, pitchmen dressed all in marijuana green approach passers-
by with offers of a $35, 10-minute evaluation for a medical marijuana recommendation for 
everything from cancer to appetite loss.”); Michael Roberts, Medical Marijuana v. 
Recreational Use: NORML Controversy, Colorado Connection, DENVER WESTWORD 
BLOGS (Jan. 25, 2012, 12:25 PM), http://blogs.westword.com/latestword/2012/01/medical 
_marijuana_norml_controversy_colorado.php (reporting that the president of NORML 
referred to medical marijuana as a “farce”). 
35 Many in the marijuana law reform movement dislike the term “recreational use” and 
prefer the phrase “adult use.” See Interview by Brandon Feivor with Doug Fine, author of 
TOO HIGH TO FAIL: CANNABIS AND THE NEW GREEN ECONOMIC REVOLUTION (2012), on 
ROYALPURPLENEWS.COM (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://royalpurplenews.com/?p 
=9235 (“I don’t use the term recreational, I prefer adult social use. I do believe the best 
solution for public safety in the U.S. is removing cannabis from the Federal Controlled 
Substances Act entirely, and letting states regulate it for adult use like alcohol.”). 
36 See, e.g., John Hoeffel, Holder Vows Fight Over Prop. 19, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/16/local/la-me-marijuana-holder-20101016. 
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final weeks before the election when Holder expressed the federal 
government’s staunch opposition to the initiative. Proposition 19 lost 
by seven percentage points.37 
The 2012 election proved a turning point, however. With President 
Obama running for reelection, his administration was less free to flex 
federal muscle against marijuana decriminalization. Legalization 
initiatives were put forward in three states—Oregon, Washington, and 
Colorado—and passed in Washington and Colorado.38 These two 
successful initiatives were similar in form; both immediately repealed 
the state-level laws criminalizing possession of up to an ounce of 
marijuana and gave the state legislatures a year to come up with a 
regulatory regime for the licensing and taxing of retail marijuana 
stores.39 Both states are presently moving ahead with these plans 
while keeping an uneasy eye on the federal government’s response.40 
The next section examines the interplay between state and federal 
marijuana laws, considering the impact of legal change at the state 
level in light of the fact that marijuana remains a Schedule I 
controlled substance at the federal level. 
	
37 See, e.g., Kevin Fagan, “Proposition 19 Defeat Shows Great Divide over Pot,” SF 
GATE (Nov. 7, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Proposition-19       
-defeat-shows-great-divide-over-pot-3167559.php (“Many agreed that one of the stiffest 
blows to Prop. 19 was U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement Oct. 14 that if 
Californians passed the measure, he would still ‘vigorously enforce’ the federal ban on 
possessing, growing or selling the drug. Shortly afterward, the Field Poll and several other 
surveys that once had Prop. 19 leading showed that the initiative had done an about-face. 
By election day, the Field Poll had the measure down by seven points - almost exactly the 
eventual margin of defeat.”). 
38 Jack Heely, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions Remain, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/marijuana        
-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html. 
39 See COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(3) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
following acts are not unlawful and shall not be an offense under Colorado Law . . . (a) 
[p]ossessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting marijuana accessories or one 
ounce or less of marijuana.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013 (2012) (“The possession, 
by a person twenty-one years of age or older, of useable marijuana or marijuana-infused 
products in amounts that do not exceed those set forth in RCW 69.50.360(3) is not a 
violation of this section, this chapter, or any other provision of Washington state law.”). 
40 In the interest of full disclosure, we note that Professor Kamin sits on Colorado’s 
marijuana regulation task force. See Gov. Hickenlooper Signs Amendment 64 
Proclamation, Creates Task Force to Recommend Needed Legislative Actions, COLO. 
(Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovHickenlooper/CBON/125163 
4887823. 
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C. Uneasy Federalism—The Impact of State Marijuana Laws 
Although Congress clearly has the power both to regulate 
marijuana and to preempt any and all state regulation of that 
substance,41 it has so far chosen not to do so. The CSA explicitly 
disclaims an intent to preempt the field of regulation.42 However, 
even if the federal government sought to preempt state marijuana 
laws, its power to do so is inherently limited. For example, Congress 
cannot force the states to enact legislation consistent with the CSA 
nor to repeal laws that are inconsistent with it.43 Furthermore, it 
cannot enlist unwilling state or local officials in the enforcement of 
federal laws.44 
This is not to say, of course, that no consequences flow from the 
federal government’s continued prohibition of conduct that more than 
a third of the states have endorsed. Obviously, the most serious of 
these consequences is the ever-present threat of federal prosecution. 
Although there have been only a handful of federal prosecutions of 
those acting in conformance with state law, recent actions by United 
States Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country indicate that the risk 
to MMJ practitioners remains nonnegligible.45 These enforcement 
actions demonstrate the difficulty of trying to determine exactly how 
	
41 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1445–46 (2009) 
(“It is hornbook law that Congress may preempt any state law that obstructs, contradicts, 
impedes, or conflicts with federal law. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that when 
Congress possesses the constitutional authority to regulate an activity, it may preempt any 
state law governing that same activity. Given that there are so few limits on Congress’s 
substantive powers, there would seemingly be no limit to its preemption power either.”). 
42 See 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2006) (“No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision 
operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same 
subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a 
positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the 
two cannot consistently stand together.”). 
43 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government 
may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal 
regulatory programs.”). 
44 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government 
may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”). 
45 See Jennifer Medina, U.S. Attorneys in California Set Crackdown on Marijuana, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/08/us/california-to-crack        
-down-on-medical-marijuana.html; U.S. Attorney Says Crackdown on Medical Marijuana 
Operations Will Continue, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Apr. 22, 2012, 12:45 PM), http://billings 
gazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/u-s-attorney-says-crackdown-on-medical      
-marijuana-operations-will/article_29c8a2d3-7fb1-55fe-970c-ed59ff33641d.html. 
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the CSA will be enforced against the marijuana industry going 
forward. 
This is particularly true when trying to determine the views of the 
current administration in Washington. Marijuana activists and others 
seized on President Obama’s pro-marijuana sound bites (emboldened, 
no doubt, by images on the web purporting to show President Obama 
smoking a joint during his youth)46 as a harbinger of a potential 
change in policy with regard to federal enforcement of marijuana 
laws.47 These supporters found further encouragement in statements 
Attorney General Eric Holder made early in 2009 announcing a shift 
in the enforcement of federal marijuana law. Holder was quoted as 
saying that the administration would only be going after those who 
masquerade as medical dispensaries and “use medical marijuana laws 
as a shield.”48 
In October of 2009, Holder’s Justice Department issued a much-
publicized memorandum instructing the United States Attorneys 
throughout the country on the enforcement of marijuana laws.49 The 
memo, written by Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, states that 
its goal is to provide “uniform guidance to focus federal 
investigations and prosecutions in these States on core federal 
enforcement priorities.”50 This memo was seized upon by many pro-
marijuana advocates as an opportunity. In states that had adopted 
MMJ provisions, the memo was seen as a green light to the open sale 
of marijuana. For example, in states such as Colorado and California, 
2009 saw an explosion in the number of storefront marijuana 
dispensaries openly doing business in a product prohibited under 
federal law.51 
	
46 A web search for the image in the fall of 2012 revealed that it had appeared on more 
than 250 different websites. 
47 Scott Morgan, Will Obama End the Medical Marijuana Raids?, 
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Nov. 6, 2008), http://stopthedrugwar.org/speakeasy/2008/nov 
/06/will_obama_end_medical_marijuana. 
48 David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Obama Administration to Stop Raids on Medical 
Marijuana Dispensers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19 
/us/19holder.html. 
49 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on 
Investigating and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Med. Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf 
[hereinafter Ogden Memo]. 
50 Id. at 1. 
51 See In California, Marijuana Dispensaries Outnumber Starbucks, NPR (Oct. 15, 
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113822156 (“[T]here are 
more medical marijuana dispensaries than Starbucks . . . .”); W. Zachary Malinowski, 
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A close reading of the Ogden memo shows that the optimistic 
interpretation of those who rushed into the marijuana business in 2009 
was either careless or delusional. Although it was read by many as a 
pledge not to enforce federal marijuana laws in those states that have 
adopted MMJ laws, the Ogden memo in fact comes closer to doing 
the opposite: “The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal 
drugs, including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug 
manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core priority 
in the Department’s efforts against narcotics and dangerous drugs, 
and the Department’s investigative and prosecutorial resources should 
be directed towards these objectives.”52 The memo also makes clear 
that commercial enterprises dealing marijuana remain a priority for 
federal enforcement, even if they are in compliance with state 
requirements regarding MMJ.53 In fact, the memo goes on to state 
explicitly that compliance with state law is a relevant factor, but in no 
way determines the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction.54 
That the Ogden memo was being misinterpreted—willfully or 
otherwise, and despite its relatively clear warnings about the 
continued viability of the CSA—did not escape the notice of the 
Department of Justice. In the summer of 2010—eight months after the 
issuance of the Ogden memo—a second memo on essentially the 
same topic, written by Deputy Attorney General James Cole, was 
released by the Justice Department. That memo states that while the 
Justice Department’s policy has not changed, facts on the ground 
certainly have: 
 The Department’s view of the efficient use of limited federal 
resources as articulated in the Ogden Memorandum has not 
changed. There has, however, been an increase in the scope of 
commercial cultivation, sale, distribution and use of marijuana for 
purported medical purposes. For example, within the past 12 
months, several jurisdictions have considered or enacted legislation 
to authorize multiple large-scale, privately-operated industrial 
marijuana cultivation centers. Some of these planned facilities have 
	
Colorado’s Marijuana Dispensary Boom, Now Undergoing Regulation, Leads to 
Explosion of Patients Seeking Licenses, 420MAGAZINE http://www.420magazine.com 
/forums/medical-marijuana-news/138451-colorado-s-marijuana-dispensary-boom-leads     
-explosion-patients-seeking-licenses.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (noting that after the 
2009 memo from the Obama administration, the number of patients seeking medical 
marijuana cards shot up to over 1000 per week). 
52 Ogden Memo, supra note 49, at 1. 
53 Id. at 2. 
54 Id. 
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revenue projections of the millions of dollars based on the planned 
cultivation of tens of thousands of cannabis plants.55 
The Cole memo was thus an acknowledgement that the Ogden 
memo had inadvertently led to an increase in marijuana cultivation 
and sale in those states that permitted MMJ to be used and sold. What 
is more, the Cole memo went on to make clear just how seriously 
many had misread federal policy. 
 The Ogden Memorandum was never intended to shield such 
activities from federal enforcement action and prosecution, even 
where those activities purport to comply with state law. Persons 
who are in the business of cultivating, selling, or distributing 
marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such activities, are in 
violation of the [CSA], regardless of state law. Consistent with the 
resource constraints and the discretion you may exercise in your 
district, such persons are subject to federal enforcement action, 
including potential prosecution. State laws or local ordinances are 
not a defense to civil . . . enforcement of federal law with respect to 
such conduct, including enforcement of the CSA.56 
Events of the next several months made clear that this was more 
than mere rhetoric. In the fall of 2011, California’s four United States 
Attorneys announced that a federal grand jury had returned 
indictments against several marijuana cooperative owners throughout 
the state, charging them with violations of the CSA.57 In addition, the 
United States Attorneys sent cease and desist letters to both 
dispensary owners and their landlords, giving them forty-five days to 
move their operations or else face arrest.58 In addition to the clear 
threat of criminal prosecution, this action made clear that the threat of 
civil enforcement—explicit in the Cole memo—was not an empty 
one.59 For a federal government with limited enforcement resources, 
the specter of civil forfeiture is an incredibly powerful tool.60 Similar 
	
55 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on 
Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for 
Med. Use 1 (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-guidance     
-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf [hereinafter Cole Memo]. 
56 Id. at 2. 
57 Feds Warn, Indict California Medical Marijuana Dispensary Operators, KABC-TV 
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/story?section=news/state&id=8383655 
(describing recent federal law enforcement actions against California marijuana 
dispensaries). 
58 Id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
KAMIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2013  9:58 AM 
884 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 869 
crackdowns have since taken place in Washington state, Colorado, 
and Montana.61 
Just as the Justice Department’s enforcement of the CSA has not 
been limited to the enforcement of criminal provisions, the federal 
government’s response to MMJ has not been limited to the 
Department of Justice. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) invoked a 
Reagan-era provision in support of the principle that those in the 
business of dispensing MMJ may not deduct their business expenses 
as other businesses do.62 Using this provision, the IRS has sought to 
collect back taxes from those it believes wrongfully claimed 
deductions.63 This provision could decimate the industry; few 
businesses can afford to pay income tax on their gross receipts.64 
Combined with the increasing unwillingness of banks and credit card 
	
61 Jamie Kelly, Former Grizzly Pleads Not Guilty to Federal Drug Charges, 
MISSOULIAN (Jan. 19, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional 
/former-grizzly-pleads-not-guilty-to-federal-drug-charges/article_5166136a-4304-11e1-a8 
86-0019bb2963f4.html#ixzz1k1FXdfT4; Medical Marijuana: Federal Crackdown, 
Similar to That in California, Begins in Colorado, HUFF POST (Jan. 12, 2012, 4:28 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/medical-marijuana-federal_n_1202725.html. 
62 See Letter from Andrew J. Keyso, Deputy Assoc. Chief Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, to Congressman Barney Frank, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 10, 2010), 
available at http://ww.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/11-0005.pdf (“Section 280E of the Code 
disallows deductions incurred in the trade or business of trafficking in controlled 
substances that federal law or the law of any state in which the taxpayer conducts the 
business prohibits.”). 
63 Al Olson, IRS Ruling Strikes Fear in Medical Marijuana Industry, NBCNEWS.COM 
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://bottomline.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/10/04/8153459-irs-ruling     
-strikes-fear-in-medical-marijuana-industry (quoting a target of IRS enforcement as 
saying: “I see only two outcomes here . . . . Either this IRS assessment has to change or we 
go out of business. There really isn’t a middle ground for us.”). 
64 In addition, in September 2011, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives sent a letter to all licensed firearms dealers, instructing them that all licensed 
marijuana patients were prohibited under federal law from obtaining firearms. Open Letter 
from Arthur Herbert, Assistant Dir., Enforcement Programs and Servs., Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, to All Fed. Firearms Licensees (Sept. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.nssf.org/share/PDF/ATFOpenLetter092111.pdf (“[A]ny person 
who uses or is addicted to marijuana, regardless of whether his or her State has passed 
legislation authorizing marijuana use for medical purposes, is an unlawful user of or 
addicted to a controlled substance, and is prohibited by Federal law from possessing 
firearms or ammunition.”). The ban has been criticized by at least one State Attorney 
General. See Montana Objects to Gun Ban for Medical Pot Users, BOZEMAN DAILY 
CHRON. (Oct. 3, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/state 
/article_09ada53e-ee17-11e0-a232-001cc4c002e0.html. The ban has also been challenged 
in federal court by a Nevada woman who was denied a handgun she sought for self-
protection because the seller was aware that she was an MMJ patient. Steve Green, 
Nevada Woman Fighting Federal Ban on Medical Pot Users Owning Firearms, VEGAS 
INC. (Oct. 18, 2011, 9:20 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/oct/18/nevada            
-woman/. 
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companies to do business with the industry,65 it is becoming harder 
and harder for marijuana businesses to continue to do business at all. 
These recent actions make clear that even if the federal government 
does not prosecute everyone actively violating the CSA—and 
realistically, it cannot achieve anything like full enforcement—other 
modes of enforcement besides criminal prohibitions still have teeth. 
Many benefits of American life carry a promise not to violate any 
criminal prohibitions, and these benefits may thus be forfeited by 
those violating the CSA even if they are complying with state 
marijuana laws. For example, residents of public housing pledge not 
to violate criminal laws while living in the unit, probationers and 
parolees agree that they will not use any controlled substances during 
their release, and leases often condition continued occupancy on the 
lessee’s agreement not to use the premises for criminal purposes.66 In 
a world where marijuana is permitted under state law but prohibited 
under federal law, the legal consequences of marijuana use will be 
very difficult for everyone to ascertain. 
Furthermore, as Colorado and Washington begin making plans for 
a regulated recreational marijuana industry, the complications and 
risks will only multiply. The recreational marijuana industry promises 
to be many times larger than the existing MMJ industry. For example, 
while just over 100,000 people currently hold medical marijuana 
cards in Colorado,67 the adult population in the state is over 3.5 
million.68 If this difference in size is any indication, state 
decriminalization can be expected to lead to a growth in the industry 
by at least an order of magnitude. This potentially explosive growth in 
the marijuana business will create large opportunities for investors but 
	
65 See, e.g., John Ingold, Last Bank Shuts Doors on Colorado Pot Dispensaries, 
DENVERPOST.COM (Oct. 1, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/marijuana 
/ci_19016660; Jonathan Martin, Medical-Marijuana Dispensaries Run Into Trouble at the 
Bank, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/local 
news/2018103547_maribanking30m.html. 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006) (stating that any drug-related criminal activity by 
a public housing tenant, on or off such premises, shall be cause for termination of 
tenancy); see also STATE OF NEV. BD. OF PAROLE COMM’RS, SAMPLE PAROLE 
AGREEMENT, available at http://www.parole.nv.gov/sites/parole/files/pdf/pubmeet 
/Institutional_Parole_Agreement_draft.PDF. 
67 See COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH AND ENV’T, MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGISTRY 
PROGRAM UPDATE (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE-CHEIS 
/CBON/1251593017044 (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
68 Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2010), http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices-/jsf/pages/productview 
.xhtml?src=bkmk (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
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also an exponential increase in the number of people affected by the 
current web of overlapping and contradictory state and federal 
regulation. 
II 
REPRESENTATION OF MARIJUANA CLIENTS: CRIMINAL CONCERNS 
The increased willingness of the federal government to prosecute 
those involved in the MMJ industry in the states reminds us that there 
are significant criminal risks faced by those who sell marijuana, 
whether in the MMJ context or the emerging recreational market. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that the risks are borne not 
just by those participating in the industry directly; those who do 
business with the marijuana industry are also at risk. The criminal law 
punishes not just those who actively commit crimes but also those 
who aid and abet, or conspire with those who commit crimes. In 
particular, the CSA explicitly provides for the punishment of 
accomplices and coconspirators.69 As we shall see, these doctrines 
have significant implications for persons—landlords, wholesale 
suppliers, employees, and particularly lawyers—who do business 
with those running marijuana businesses. As marijuana—both 
medical and recreational—becomes a bigger industry, more and more 
people will find themselves facing the question of where the line 
between permissible and impermissible conduct lies. 
A. Accomplice Liability 
Throughout the English-speaking world, the criminal law punishes 
not merely those who commit crimes themselves, but also those who 
intentionally assist or facilitate their commission. While the common 
law had a profusion of terms for those who aid in the commission of 
an offense—aiders and abettors, accomplices before the fact, 
accessories after the fact, et cetera—with varying degrees of 
culpability, the modern law of accomplice liability is generally much 
more streamlined.70 Today, one is generally liable for a crime if one 
	
69 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Recall that the Cole Memo explicitly notes that “those who 
knowingly facilitate such activities [cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana], are in 
violation of the [CSA] . . . .” See Cole Memo, supra note 55, at 2. 
70 See, e.g., Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider 
and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1355–56 
(2002) (“[I]t was Congress’s intent to eliminate the archaic, common-law distinctions 
between the aider and abettor and the principal, to eliminate the need to determine whether 
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commits it oneself (the principal) or if one aids another to commit it 
(the accomplice). While this much is now relatively clear, there 
remains much debate regarding what mental state a purported 
accomplice must have in order to be liable for the principal’s 
conduct.71 This discussion often boils down to whether one who 
intentionally engages in conduct that in fact furthers the crime is 
liable as an accomplice if she is merely indifferent as to whether the 
crime is committed.72 
Following the lead of the Model Penal Code (MPC),73 most states 
today require that an accomplice not merely aid the principal to 
commit the offense, but that he have an actual intent to aid the 
commission of that offense.74 That is, it is generally insufficient to 
show merely that the erstwhile accomplice knowingly assisted the 
principal to commit the offense; it must generally be shown that it 
	
the defendant under consideration had acted as a principal or an aider and abettor, and in 
general, to make it easier to convict the aider and abettor.”). 
71 See Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 236 
(2000) (“For decades, the American courts and legislatures have debated whether 
knowledge or ‘true purpose’ should be the required mens rea for accomplice liability.”). 
72 See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that 
even though Lauria intended to and did provide his answering service to a criminal 
enterprise, there was no evidence that he intended to further that enterprise, and was thus 
absolved of his liability as a conspirator). 
73 Written by the American Law Institute in the 1960s, the MPC’s provisions have had 
an enormous impact on law reform in the United States over the last fifty years. See Paul 
H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007) (“Promulgated in 1962, the code prompted a wave of state 
code reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, each influenced to some extent by the Model Penal 
Code.”). 
74 Infra note 77; see MODEL PENAL CODE §2.06 (1985): 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by 
the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. 
(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: 
. . . 
(c) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the 
offense. 
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense 
if: 
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense, he 
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it; or 
(iii) having a legal duty to prevent the commission of an offense, fails 
to make proper effort so to do . . . . 
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was the accomplice’s intent to do so. Adopting an intent standard 
rather than the easier to prove knowledge requirement,75 the MPC 
drafters drew on Judge Learned Hand’s famous statement in United 
States v. Peoni that liability as an accomplice requires the defendant 
to intentionally associate himself with a criminal venture.76 Parsing a 
statute that punishes a party who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces, or procures” the commission of a crime, Hand noted the 
ancient origin of this string of verbs, observing that: 
 [A]ll these definitions . . . demand that he in some sort associate 
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something 
that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it 
succeed. All the words used—even the most colorless, “abet”—
carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it.77 
That is, under Judge Hand’s principle, the defendant must provide aid 
to a principal because of—and not in spite of—the fact that the 
conduct of the principal is criminal. Although there remains great 
controversy regarding this conclusion, it is probably the majority rule 
in the United States.78 
This distinction between knowledge and intent in this context is no 
idle, semantic one. Holding criminally liable those who, while 
indifferent to the criminal goals of others, knowingly facilitate the 
others’ conduct would greatly broaden the scope of criminal liability. 
This is most easily seen in the context of providers of lawful services 
who make their services available to anyone who can pay. The gas 
	
75 While an early draft of the MPC accomplice liability provision set forth knowledge 
as a sufficient mens rea, that draft was eventually rejected in favor of what the MPC refers 
to as “purpose.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1 1985) (“A person 
is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if . . . acting with 
knowledge that such other person was committing or had the purpose of committing the 
crime, he knowingly substantially facilitated its commission.” (emphasis added)). 
76 See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 
77 Id. 
78 See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985). Under the older cases, 
illustrated by Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635, 636–37 (4th Cir. 1940), and Bacon v. 
United States, 127 F.2d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 1942), it was enough that the aider and abettor 
knew the principal’s purpose. Although this is still the test in some states (see, for 
example, Sanders/Miller v. Logan, 710 F.2d 645, 652 (10th Cir. 1983)), after the Supreme 
Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), adopted Judge Learned 
Hand’s test—that the aider and abettor “in some sort associate himself with the venture, 
that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his 
action to make it succeed,” United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)—it 
came to be generally accepted that the aider and abettor must share the principal’s purpose 
in order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aider and abettor statute. See, 
e.g., United States v. Paone, 758 F.2d 774, 775–76 (1st Cir. 1985). 
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station owner who sells gas to the arsonist and the driver alike, or the 
website that accepts advertisements from prostitutes and gardeners 
alike, is not generally liable when its services are misused. This is true 
even when the provider of services knows that some of the persons 
purchasing her services are using them for nefarious purposes. The 
rationale for the intent requirement is grounded in part in a respect for 
and deference to American individualism. The concern is that a 
knowledge standard would turn every merchant into his brother’s 
keeper, requiring every shop owner to inquire into his client’s motives 
and plans. Rather, a merchant is protected from prosecution as an 
accomplice so long as she provides the same service to all clients 
regardless of their plans for her services.79 
The unwillingness of the criminal law to require merchants to 
inquire into the affairs of their customers is an example of a broader 
phenomenon. The criminal law, particularly in the United States, has 
long been loath to use criminal sanctions to enforce ethics. For 
example, misprision of felony—the nonreporting of a crime of which 
an individual is aware—has been rejected in nearly all American 
jurisdictions.80 Similarly, American law has generally been unwilling 
to impose a Good Samaritan requirement on the public.81 While many 
other Western nations have passed legislation requiring those capable 
of giving aid to others in peril to do so when it can be done without 
risk,82 the United States has consistently refused to so impose such a 
requirement. In the United States, one is criminally liable for failing 
to act only when the law has expressly imposed a duty to act; while 
parents are obligated to protect children and sea captains are obligated 
to protect their passengers, there is no general obligation to protect 
others. In a similar way a merchant is not liable for failing to take 
steps to keep her lawful goods or services from being misused by her 
clientele. 
	
79 People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (rejecting accomplice 
liability where a provider of answering services made those services available on the same 
terms to prostitutes and lawful users alike). 
80 Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1078 (Md. 1979) (holding that misprision of felony is 
not a chargeable offense in Maryland). But see 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); United States v. 
Brantley, 461 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2012); Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 
(11th Cir. 2002) (stating that the essential elements of a misprision of a felony are 
knowledge of a crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation). 
81 See, e.g., John. T. Pardun, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 
20 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L. & COMP. L.J. 411, 591 (1998). 
82 Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12, pt. 1, ch. 1, no. 2 
(2006). 
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As we shall see, this distinction—between liability based on 
knowledge and liability based on the intent of the would-be 
accomplice—has significant consequences for attorneys working in 
the marijuana industry. 
B. Coconspirator Liability 
A conspiracy is an agreement for criminal purposes. As set forth in 
the United States Code: 
[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense 
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any 
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more 
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, 
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both.83 
The conspiracy doctrine differs from the concept of accomplice 
liability in that conspiracy is both an independent offense and a theory 
of vicarious liability. That is, a defendant can be charged both with 
the crime of conspiracy and the substantive crimes committed by each 
of the others in the conspiracy.84 In this way, conspiracy law is a 
more effective, far-reaching tool for prosecutors than accomplice 
liability.85 
As with accomplice liability, there exists an ongoing controversy 
with regard to the mental state necessary to bring a particular party to 
an agreement into a conspiracy. Clearly it is not enough that the 
defendant agreed with others who had nefarious goals; for example, 
the car owner who agrees to lend his car to a friend does not become 
	
83 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
84 See, e.g., Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) (holding that “conspiracy 
to commit an offense and the subsequent commission of that crime normally do not merge 
into a single punishable act”); People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378, 388 (Colo. 1982) 
(holding that a conspiracy charge is separate and distinct from the commission of the 
crime that was the object of the conspiracy). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1) 
(1985) (stating that a criminal defendant can be convicted of conspiring to commit an 
offense or of committing the offense, but not both). 
85 A conspiracy may also be charged in any jurisdiction where any of the conspirators 
did any of the overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, the hearsay statements of 
coconspirators are admissible against one another, coconspirators may be tried together in 
a single proceeding, and so on. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 461 (1827); State v. 
Overton, 298 S.E.2d 695, 716 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding jurisdiction existed over 
those involved in a “criminal conspiracy if any one of the conspirators commits an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the State”); see also United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) (holding statements by coconspirators admissible, and not barred 
as hearsay); United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
general rule is that coconspirators may be tried together). 
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his friend’s coconspirator merely because the car is used in a bank 
robbery. Rather, some mens rea must be demonstrated with regard to 
the criminal ends of those with whom the defendant agrees. Although 
there is less agreement regarding conspiracy than there is regarding 
accomplice liability, many courts hold that a true intent is required 
with regard to conspiracy as well.86 It is not enough that the defendant 
has knowingly associated with others for criminal purposes; rather it 
must be shown that she intends to achieve those criminal goals. 
Again, this distinction arises most often in the case of merchants. 
The classic case of People v. Lauria demonstrates the point. Lauria 
ran an answering service and many of his customers were 
prostitutes.87 Based solely on these facts, he was charged with 
conspiring with his clients to commit prostitution.88 He admitted to 
knowing that prostitutes used his services, but argued that his 
knowledge was insufficient to bring him within a criminal 
conspiracy.89 The court held that only under certain circumstances 
could intent to join a conspiracy be inferred from knowledge that one 
was agreeing with criminals—where the purveyor of legal goods has 
acquired a stake in the illegal venture (for example, charging unlawful 
clients a higher rate); where there is no legitimate use for the goods or 
services (for example, publishing a list that is nothing but the names 
and addresses of prostitutes); or where an intent to conspire can be 
inferred from the fact that the volume of business with the buyer is 
“grossly disproportionate to any legitimate demand” (as where a 
pharmacist provides a doctor with hundreds of times more painkiller 
than there is a lawful demand for).90 The MPC and a majority of 
states also require true intent.91 
	
86 See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943) (finding that 
the “gist of a conspiracy” is that the defendant knows of the other’s illegal purpose and 
that he “intends to further, promote and cooperate in it.” (emphasis added)); United States 
v. Burgos, 94. F.3d 849, 860 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[B]lack letter conspiracy law requires the 
Government to prove: (1) an agreement between two or more persons, which constitutes 
the act; and (2) an intent thereby to achieve a certain objective which, under the common 
law definition, is the doing of either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means.” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 853 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(“[T]o establish that a defendant belonged to and participated in a conspiracy, the 
government must prove two kinds of intent: “intent to agree and intent to commit the 
substantive offense.”). 
87 People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 674–75. 
90 Id. at 632–33. 
91 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (“Definition of Conspiracy. A 
person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 
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While true intent rather than knowledge is therefore the linchpin of 
coconspirator liability, an important caveat is in order, however. The 
Lauria court concluded that, while knowing agreement with 
prostitutes was insufficient to make Lauria responsible for the acts of 
prostitution, knowledge might suffice for conspiracy to commit more 
serious crimes.92 The policy arguments in favor of such a holding are 
obvious. While it seems a heavy burden to deputize law-abiding 
merchants in the enforcement of victimless crimes and misdemeanors, 
there is greater revulsion at the idea that a gun merchant could avoid 
being brought into a murder conspiracy because he merely “knew” 
that he was selling a gun to a killer but did not “intend” that the 
killing occur.93 
Both of these doctrines—accomplice and coconspirator liability—
obviously raise serious concerns for attorneys working with those in 
the marijuana field. The next section investigates the criminal 
prosecution of lawyers more generally, concluding that while such 
prosecutions are relatively rare, they are not so infrequent that 
lawyers should consider themselves beyond the reach of the criminal 
law. 
C. The Criminal Prosecution of Lawyers 
Lawyers are obviously not immune from the dictates of the 
criminal law and—like any other provider of lawful services—are 
liable as accomplices and conspirators when their provision of legal 
services satisfies the elements of these doctrines.94 
As a general matter, it is unusual, though not unheard of, for 
lawyers to be criminally charged for assisting the criminal activity of 
their clients through representation.95 Many cases of lawyer 
	
purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other person 
or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such 
crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (b) agrees to aid such other 
person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 
solicitation to commit such crime.” (emphasis added)). 
92 Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 634. 
93 This policy analysis has also led some jurisdictions to criminalize the knowing 
facilitation of crimes—independent of any liability as an accomplice or coconspirator. 
94 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 209 
(2010) (“Lawyers also assume that the advice of counsel defense will preclude their own 
liability. This is completely false.”). 
95 See id. at 212 (“Although many lawyers have been prosecuted and convicted as 
accomplices, these cases all involved a level of participation in the criminality that went 
beyond simple advice-giving.”); Fred C. Zacharias, Lawyers As Gatekeepers, 41 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004). 
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prosecution involve securities fraud or other white collar crime where 
attorneys are charged as accomplices based on their preparing, filing, 
and vouching for fraudulent or incomplete documents. For example, 
in November of 2010 federal officials indicted Lauren Stevens, a 
former Assistant General Counsel at the pharmaceutical firm 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for allegedly providing misleading 
responses to a government investigation of the firm.96 The 
government further alleged that Ms. Stevens obstructed justice by 
certifying that GSK’s submissions to the government were complete 
when she knew the opposite to be true.97 On May 20, 2011, the trial 
judge (having previously quashed the grand jury indictment in the 
case, requiring the government to refile its charges) granted a defense 
motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29.98 The judge stated 
that he was granting the Rule 29 motion—his first in seven and a half 
years on the bench—in part because “a lawyer should never fear 
prosecution because of advice that he or she has given to a client who 
consults him or her . . . .”99 The judge went on that to hold that, 
 The institutional problem that causes me a great concern is that 
while lawyers should not get a free pass, the Court should be 
vigilant to permit the practice of law to be carried on, to be engaged 
in, and to allow lawyers to do their job of zealously representing the 
interests of their client. Anything that interferes with that is 
something that the court system should not countenance.100 
	
96 Duff Wilson, Former Glaxo Lawyer Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010, 2:25 PM), 
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/former-glaxo-lawyer-indicted/. 
97 Id. 
98 See United States v. Stevens, No. RWT-10-694, slip op. (D. Md. May 10, 2011). The 
decision to take the case from the jury on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence was 
non-reviewable. See Richard Sauber & Michael Waldman, Unlimited Power: Rule 29(A) 
and the Unreviewability of Directed Judgments of Acquittal, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 433–
34 (1994) (“In all of federal jurisprudence there is only one district court ruling that is both 
absolutely dispositive and entirely unappealable. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 
enables the trial judge upon her own initiative or motion of the defense to direct a 
judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial at any time prior to the submission of the case to 
the jury. Once the judgment of acquittal is entered, the government’s right of appeal is 
effectively blocked by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as the only 
remedy available to the Court of Appeals would be to order a retrial. No matter how 
irrational or capricious, the district judge’s ruling terminating the prosecution cannot be 
appealed.” (footnote omitted)). 
99 Stevens, No. RWT-10-694, slip op. at 9. 
100 Id. at 10. 
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Other criminal cases against attorneys have focused on lawyers whose 
close connection with organized crime or other disfavored groups has 
brought them within the scope of ongoing criminal enterprises.101 
Notably, while prosecutors have traditionally been loath to indict 
attorneys for misconduct that is part and parcel of the practice of 
law,102 many defense attorneys believe that criminal prosecution of 
lawyers acting qua lawyers is an increasingly common tactic against 
those lawyers representing unpopular defendants.103 Perhaps the most 
famous recent example of an attorney being prosecuted for her role in 
the representation of her client is the charging of New York attorney 
Lynne Stewart with conspiracy to provide material support to a 
terrorist organization for her role in passing communications between 
her client and others. Stewart was convicted of conspiracy (and 
subsequently of perjury), disbarred, and sentenced to ten years in 
prison.104 The case led to widespread criticism, particularly among 
the criminal defense bar, that the prosecution was sending a message 
to those representing terror suspects that their conduct was being 
closely monitored.105 While there is not yet a reported case of an 
	
101 See, e.g., United States v. Abbell, 271 F.3d 1291–1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
the prosecution of two attorneys on conspiracy and money-laundering charges for their 
role in representing the head of an alleged drug cartel); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 
924, 932–35 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding a conviction in a case in which the government 
alleged, inter alia, that counsel had served as “house counsel” to the Gamino Crime 
Family); United States v. Nesser, 939 F. Supp. 417, 421 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding an 
attorney liable for drug distribution and money laundering conspiracies through 
knowledge or willful blindness of the illegal activities, which he was found to be 
furthering by providing his legal services). 
102 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 327, 328–29 (1998) (“The tension between criminal law and professional norms is 
most interesting, and most troubling, where the lawyer in question is a criminal defense 
lawyer. Ordinarily, prosecutors are expected to be professionally detached. Yet, the 
criminal law gives prosecutors authority to regulate their professional adversaries—
criminal defense lawyers. In this situation, the prosecutor’s professional judgment and 
detachment are to be trusted least. Consequently, there is a particular danger not only of 
overcriminalization, but of overdeterrence—that is, to avoid the possibility of an 
unwarranted prosecution, lawyers may refrain from engaging in lawful conduct that is 
professionally desirable.”). 
103 See, e.g., Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, Preferring Order to Justice, 61 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1331, 1374 (2012) (“The successful prosecution of Stewart has had a chilling 
effect on lawyers throughout the country; many will not take these terror cases, and those 
who do operate with excessive caution about what they say in public and whom they 
consult for legal strategy.”). 
104 United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 93, 156, 161–64 (2d Cir. 2012). 
105 See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain 
Future of the Right to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 12 (“[T]he prosecution strategy 
utilized by the government could have reverberations that are felt for decades to come.”); 
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attorney being prosecuted for her involvement in a marijuana 
company’s violations of the CSA, there is no logical reason why 
accomplice or coconspirator liability should be limited to these few 
contexts. 
A cynical explanation for the relative dearth of cases involving the 
criminal prosecution of lawyers for assisting their criminal clients is 
that is an example of lawyers protecting their own. That is, a cynic 
could argue that prosecutors are unwilling to pursue charges against 
fellow lawyers out of an ugly version of professional courtesy.106 A 
more likely explanation, we believe, is that many prosecutors have a 
well-grounded concern that prosecuting other attorneys will be 
perceived as an intrusion into the exclusive power of the courts to 
regulate attorneys.107 Put another way, the shortage of prosecutions of 
lawyers could reflect a sincere belief on the part of prosecutors that 
attorneys’ misconduct should be primarily dealt with as a disciplinary 
matter rather than a criminal affair.108 
Other prosecutors may fear interfering with or undermining 
attorney-client relationships.109 The ability of clients to find effective 
representation is a core requirement of our legal system and, in the 
context of criminal defense, a constitutional right in many 
instances.110 If lawyers fear that the representation of disfavored 
	
Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege, 1 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 15, 16 (2003) stating that the message that Attorney 
General John Ashcroft sent to lawyers in indicting of Lynne Stewart was “direct and 
unambiguous: represent accused terrorists and you too may be arrested”). 
106 This phenomenon is akin perhaps to the well-documented reluctance of lawyers to 
testify against other attorneys in professional malpractice lawsuits with regard to breach of 
a fiduciary duty. W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social 
Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2017 (2001) (describing “the 
unwillingness of many lawyers to testify against one another in malpractice suits” as a 
“conspiracy of silence”). 
107 For a concise, albeit critical, analysis of the inherent powers doctrine, pursuant to 
which courts have the exclusive power to regulate lawyers, see Charles W. Wolfram, 
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—the Role of the Inherent powers Doctrine, 12 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 6–13 (1989). 
108 But see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 873, 877–82 (2012) (detailing the suspicion that prosecutors have 
historically had of professional disciplinary proceedings, believing the organized bar to be 
captured by criminal defense attorneys). 
109 See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 
§ 5.12 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing the unwillingness of prosecutors to pursue anything but 
the most egregious of attorney behavior). 
110 See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211–12 (2008) (finding that the 
right to counsel applies to all critical stages following the initial appearance before a 
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groups will open them up to investigation and possible prosecution, 
they are likely to be over-deterred—shying away from lawful, ethical 
conduct in order to remain above suspicion.111 Similarly, clients may 
be more likely to withhold—or be asked to withhold—information 
about their cases if their lawyers believe that full disclosure by clients 
will subject the lawyers to criminal liability or discipline.112 This 
reticence, in turn, will both undermine the ability of lawyers to 
represent clients effectively and deprive attorneys the opportunity to 
dissuade clients from engaging in wrongdoing.113 
Considering whether lawyers should be prosecuted for aiding their 
criminal clients’ conduct recalls the discussion above about the merits 
of punishing merchants for knowingly assisting the criminal conduct 
of their patrons. It is intuitive to argue that the case for punishing 
knowing facilitation of a crime is stronger vis-à-vis lawyers than it is 
with regard to other merchants. We argue, however, that 
countervailing factors make punishing knowing facilitation more 
rather than less problematic when applied to lawyers. Lawyers, unlike 
other providers of goods and services, are rightly seen as serving 
important, often constitutionally-based, societal goods. Any 
interpretation of criminal law that would have a deleterious effect on 
the ability of lawyers to serve that role should be carefully limited.114 
Furthermore, because effective lawyering requires a lawyer to inquire 
into the affairs of her client, a rule that punishes knowing facilitation 
	
magistrate); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (finding a right to 
counsel in all felony trials). 
111 See Green, supra note 102, at 354 (“Criminal provisions may also overdeter, 
discouraging lawyers from engaging in lawful, praiseworthy conduct out of fear that a 
prosecutor who misconstrues the conduct will launch a criminal investigation 
or prosecution.”). 
112 E.g., Travis v. Gary Cnty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“Treating involvement of a lawyer as the key unlocking § 1985 would discourage 
corporations from obtaining legal advice before acting, hardly a sound step to take.”). 
113 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2012) (Trust “is the hallmark of 
the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and 
to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally 
damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client 
effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct.”). 
114 See, e.g., Green, supra note 102, at 386 (“[L]awyers are engaged in a pursuit that 
society believes to be particularly valuable. The professional participation 
of lawyers promotes the fair resolution of criminal cases and civil disputes and better 
enables ‘members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and benefits.’ 
That is why communications between an attorney and a client are privileged under the law 
of evidence, while most other communications among individuals are not. At least in the 
case of criminal defense lawyers, this professional undertaking has a constitutional 
dimension as well.” (footnote omitted)). 
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will necessarily inhibit a lawyer from effectively representing her 
client. Unlike, say, a gas station attendant or an advertiser who can 
easily provide his or her services without making personal inquiries 
into the affairs of their patrons, the application of a knowing 
facilitation standard to the prosecution of lawyers will necessarily 
impede the capacity of a lawyer to serve as an effective advocate for 
her client. 
Thus, we argue that requiring a mens rea of true intent is an 
important protection against prosecutorial overreaching in the event 
of prosecution of marijuana lawyers as accomplices to violations of 
the CSA or with conspiring to violate the CSA. In any such 
prosecution, we argue that the government should have to prove the 
attorney’s intent to assist clients in the commission of the crime. 
Similarly, with regard to coconspirator liability, finding that an 
attorney manifests a true intent to violate the CSA simply because she 
represents a marijuana client seems farfetched unless, following 
Lauria, the lawyer charges a marijuana client a higher rate than a non-
marijuana client for similar services or has an unusually high volume 
of business with one marijuana client or with marijuana clients 
generally. 
Exactly this approach has been taken by a number of courts that 
have considered whether those who knowingly facilitate marijuana 
offenses are liable as a result under an aiding and abetting or co-
conspirator theory. For example in Conant v. Walters, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether doctors could be 
enjoined from recommending marijuana to their patients.115 The court 
agreed that doctors could be prohibited from engaging in criminal 
conduct, but it reasoned that recommending marijuana to patients who 
then seek to obtain it does not constitute aiding and abetting of the 
patients’ later possession: 
A doctor’s anticipation of patient conduct . . . does not translate into 
aiding and abetting, or conspiracy. A doctor would aid and abet by 
acting with the specific intent to provide a patient with the means to 
acquire marijuana. Similarly, a conspiracy would require that a 
doctor have knowledge that a patient intends to acquire marijuana, 
agree to help the patient acquire marijuana, and intend to help the 
patient acquire marijuana. Holding doctors responsible for whatever 
conduct the doctor could anticipate a patient might engage in after 
	
115 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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leaving the doctor’s office is simply beyond the scope of either 
conspiracy or aiding and abetting.116 
In other words, the Court held that a doctor could not be punished 
criminally merely for knowingly facilitating criminal conduct by her 
patient; rather it was only when it was shown that the doctor had an 
intent to facilitate the criminal conduct of her patient that conduct that 
the doctor’s aid would constitute aiding or abetting or coconspirator 
liability. The rationale for this conclusion seems to be the same as in 
the context of the prosecution of lawyers as their clients’ accomplices; 
making doctors responsible whenever they are aware that they are 
facilitating their clients’ misconduct would have a deleterious effect 
on the doctor-patient relationship.117 
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals considered the unusual 
case of a city seeking to overturn a court order requiring it to return 
marijuana improperly seized from a criminal defendant named 
Kha.118 The Court rejected the proposition that doing so would make 
the city an aider and abettor of Kha’s possession of that marijuana. 
The City . . . worries about the possibility it may be viewed as 
aiding and abetting a violation of federal law if its officers return 
Kha’s marijuana to him. To be liable as an aider and abettor, a 
defendant must not only know of the unlawful purpose of the 
perpetrator, he must also have the specific intent to commit, 
encourage or facilitate the commission of the offense. Stated 
differently, the defendant must associate himself with the venture 
and participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about 
and seek by his actions to make it succeed.119 
Though the city would be engaging in conduct that knowingly 
facilitated Kha’s possession of marijuana, the court had no problem 
discarding the possibility that such knowledge was sufficient to make 
the city culpable for Kha’s possession.120 
	
116 Id. at 635–36 (citations omitted). 
117 See id. at 636 (“The doctor-patient privilege reflects ‘the imperative need for 
confidence and trust’ inherent in the doctor-patient relationship and recognizes that ‘a 
physician must know all that a patient can articulate in order to identify and to treat 
disease; barriers to full disclosure would impair diagnosis and treatment.’” (quoting 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980))). 
118 City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 4th 355 (2007). 
119 Id. at 368 (citations omitted); see also San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. 
App. 4th 798, 825 n.13 (2008) (citing City of Garden Grove for the proposition that 
employees of San Diego County would not become liable as aiders and abettors of a 
violation of the CSA by setting up a medical marijuana licensing scheme in the county). 
120 See City of Garden Grove, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 663 (“[H]olding the City or 
individual officers responsible for any violations of federal law that might ensue from the 
return of Kha’s marijuana would appear to be beyond the scope of either conspiracy or 
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D. Conclusion 
It is important to remember that charging lawyers as accomplices 
or coconspirators in violations of the CSA is a tool available to 
federal—as opposed to state—prosecutors. In other words, an 
attorney in a marijuana state might be fairly confident that she will 
not be prosecuted under state law in the state in which she practices. 
She cannot be so confident, however, that federal prosecutors—who 
take an oath to uphold the laws and constitution of the United States 
rather than of any particular state121—will be quite so unwilling to 
charge those they believe to be enmeshed in violations of the CSA. 
Given how rarely an attorney will have a true intent to facilitate a 
violation of the CSA, however, federal prosecutors may conclude that 
in most instances the proper venue in which to deal with lawyers’ 
representation of marijuana clients is not a federal criminal courtroom 
but rather in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.122 In order to give 
substance to our conclusions regarding attorneys’ criminal liability, 
we suggest a similar reading of the relevant laws of professional 
responsibility. 
III 
REPRESENTATION OF MARIJUANA CLIENTS: ETHICAL CONCERNS 
A. The Traditional Understanding of Representing, Advising, and 
Assisting Clients in the Commission of Crimes 
Notwithstanding the increased nationalization, even globalization, 
of law practice,123 the regulation of lawyers continues to be, for the 
	
aiding and abetting. No one would accuse the City of willfully encouraging the violation 
of federal law, were it merely to comply with the trial courts [sic] order. The requisite 
intent to transgress the law is so clearly absent here that the argument is no more than a 
straw man.”). 
121 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006); see also U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CONSTITUTIONAL 
INITIATIVE: OATH, available at http://www.opm.gov/constitution_initiative/oath.asp (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
122 See Green, supra note 102, at 391 (“[P]rosecutors should not invoke the criminal 
law as a way of resolving disagreements within the legal profession concerning how 
lawyers should properly act on behalf of clients or as a way of choosing among competing 
conceptions of the private lawyer’s appropriate professional role.”). But see Green, supra 
note 108, at 875 (“[P]rosecutors often express mistrust of professional regulators, their 
rules, and their processes.”). 
123 Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice and the Future of 
the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 491 (2011). 
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most part, a state-based affair.124 While many actors (such as judges, 
legislators, clients, federal agencies, insurance companies), bodies of 
law (state-based rules of professional conduct, tort law, criminal law), 
and forces (competition in the market for legal services, social norms, 
professional ideology) impact the conduct of lawyers,125 the principal 
means of regulation continues to be state-based rules of professional 
conduct. In particular, the primary limit on a lawyer’s capacity to 
assist a client in criminal conduct is Rule 1.2(d) of the American Bar 
Association Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules), which states: 
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a 
lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course 
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.126 
A plain reading of the Rule appears to suggest that lawyers may 
generally represent marijuana clients in many ways without risking a 
violation. Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer “may counsel or assist a 
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity . . . or 
application of the law.” Arguably, a lawyer may represent a marijuana 
client with regard to any and all needs because such representation 
will often constitute an effort to determine the validity and application 
of the CSA given state law. While the CSA theoretically preempts 
contradictory state law, the federal government has not sued to 
preempt any state marijuana law as unconstitutional. Nor does the 
federal government regularly attempt to enforce the CSA against 
medical marijuana dispensaries and time will tell whether it will 
enforce the CSA vis-à-vis recreational users or businesses in 
Colorado and Washington.127 Consequently, there is an argument to 
be made that the validity and application of the federal law in 
question is in doubt, at least until such time as it is clarified by the 
	
124 Id. But see Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: 
The Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court and Agency Regulation, 48 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 124–28 (2011). 
125 David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 802–03 
(1992). 
126 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012). Although the Model Rules 
are not themselves binding, they have been influential nationwide; a number of states have 
adopted large parts of the Model Rules. Rule 1.2(d) has proven particularly persuasive. It 
has been adopted, almost verbatim, in forty-six states. See Status of State Review of 
Professional Conduct Rules, A.B.A. (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
127 See supra Part I. 
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courts, or by enforcement efforts by the federal government. Indeed, 
one could even argue that until the interplay between federal and state 
law is clarified, no lawyer knows her client’s conduct to be criminal. 
While much client conduct that conforms to state medical and 
recreational marijuana laws certainly appears to violate the language 
of the CSA, a lawyer could take the position that no conduct can be 
criminal if the government is aware of the conduct and systematically 
fails to enforce the law. 
Yet we believe that such an interpretation fails the common-sense 
test. Marijuana clients are generally not interested in making a good 
faith effort to determine the validity and application of the CSA. 
Rather, they are interested in owning and operating dispensaries, and, 
in the case of recreational states, selling marijuana to the public for 
profit. Indeed, most would likely be quite pleased never to have the 
application of the CSA determined as long as they can operate their 
businesses or consume their marijuana. And even if engaging in a 
violation of the CSA to force the government to react constitutes an 
effort to determine the validity or application of the law pursuant to 
Rule 1.2(d), one would be hard pressed to characterize the conduct as 
a good-faith effort given that the underlying objective of the client 
would be to engage in the conduct, not to determine the meaning of 
the law. Moreover, it is simply hard to see how drafting an 
employment contract for a marijuana client constitutes an effort to 
determine the validity of the CSA. If a lawyer is truly interested in 
helping a client to make a good-faith attempt to determine the validity 
of the law, she could advise a client to seek a declaratory judgment to 
that effect or to communicate with the federal government and seek a 
clarification. Representing marijuana clients with all of their legal 
needs seems to be just that, and not a “good faith effort to determine 
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”128 Before 
representing a marijuana client, therefore, a lawyer would have to 
contend with the substance of Rule 1.2(d). 
Rule 1.2(d) and its many state analogs draw a basic distinction 
between “counseling to” and “assisting” a client to pursue criminal 
conduct, which is prohibited, and “discussing” with the client the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct, which is 
permitted. Yet this conceptual distinction is sometimes difficult to 
discern, for two reasons. First, the Rules fail to define the terms 
“counsel to” and “assist.” Second, the meaning of “discuss” is less 
	
128 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2012). 
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than clear. As Professor Stephen Pepper notes in an influential paper, 
“[k]nowledge of the law . . . is an instrument that can be used to 
follow the law or to avoid it.”129 Discussing the law with a bad person 
may allow, and in that sense “assist,” the client in manipulating, 
avoiding, or violating the law. For example, discussing with a client 
the enforcement habits of the relevant law enforcement agencies 
seems on the one hand to merely amount to talking about the 
“consequences of any proposed course of conduct,” but on the other 
hand strikes many as “assisting” a client to violate the law.130 
The traditional reading of Rule 1.2(d) attempts to resolve the 
conceptual ambiguity about the meaning of “assist” and “discuss” 
with a two-step inquiry. It establishes whether the client’s conduct is 
criminal; and then determines whether the lawyer has actual 
knowledge that the conduct is criminal as opposed to, for example, 
mere suspicion.131 If these two conditions are met, then a lawyer 
cannot represent the client in connection with the conduct and cannot 
take any action on behalf of the client. All a lawyer can do under such 
circumstances is to discuss with the client the consequences of the 
conduct should the client pursue it. Put differently, the traditional 
interpretation of Rule 1.2(d) rejects the challenge raised by Pepper 
and purports to construe the terms “counsel to,” “assist,” and 
“discuss” mechanically: A lawyer can always passively discuss and 
explain to a client the consequences of a proposed course of conduct 
irrespective of what the client does with the information or how she 
acts on it, but a lawyer cannot take any active action on behalf of a 
client when she knows the conduct in question is criminal. A lawyer 
in such circumstances would be precluded from drafting documents, 
representing the client, negotiating on her behalf, or offering any kind 
of legal services related to the conduct beyond discussing their 
consequences with the client. 
Under this traditional approach, the application of Rule 1.2(d) in 
the MMJ and marijuana (MJ) contexts appears to be an easy case. A 
lawyer can discuss and explain to a client the state of MMJ and MJ 
law, such as the tension between federal and state law and the 
enforcement policies of the federal government, including offering 
analysis of the Ogden and Cole memoranda and the inconsistent 
	
129 Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the 
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995). 
130 Id. at 1556–58, 1565–71. 
131 It should be noted that the Rules state that actual knowledge may be inferred from 
circumstances. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2012). 
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federal record of pursuing both criminal prosecution and civil 
sanctions against dispensary owners. But because the sale and 
manufacture of marijuana is a violation of the CSA, a client selling or 
manufacturing marijuana is committing a crime, and a lawyer called 
upon not merely to explain and discuss marijuana law, but rather to 
counsel or assist a client in this conduct, for example, by drafting a 
sales agreement, would have actual knowledge that the client’s 
conduct constitutes a crime. It would seem, therefore, that Rule 1.2(d) 
forbids lawyers from assisting clients in the commission of this 
federal crime, regardless of whether their conduct is permitted by 
state law. 
The State of Maine came to a similar conclusion with regard to 
Maine Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(e), which directly 
corresponds to Model Rule 1.2(d). Asked by an attorney whether she 
could “represent or advise clients under Maine’s new Medical 
Marijuana Act,” the Maine Professional Ethics Commission warned 
against such representation. Directly referencing the Ogden memo, 
the Professional Ethics Commission described the question before it 
as “whether and how an attorney might act in regards to a client 
whose intention is to engage in conduct which is permitted by state 
law and which might not, currently, be prosecuted under federal law, 
but which nonetheless is a federal crime.”132 Although the Maine 
Commission did not explicitly state that an attorney may not ethically 
represent a marijuana business, it described such representation as 
ethically fraught: 
Where the line is drawn between permitted and forbidden activities 
needs to be evaluated on a case by case basis. Bar Counsel has 
asked for a general opinion regarding the kind of analysis which 
must be undertaken. We cannot determine which specific actions 
would run afoul of the ethical rules. We can, however, state that 
participation in this endeavor by an attorney involves a significant 
degree of risk which needs to be carefully evaluated.133 
And it is easy to see why. Bearing in mind that every sale by a 
dispensary involves a violation of federal law, there is a more than 
colorable argument that any aid the attorney provides the marijuana 
client, above and beyond mere explanation of the law, is prohibited. 
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This traditional interpretation of 1.2(d) has the attractive feature of 
offering lawyers clear and concise guidance regarding the 
representation of marijuana clients: it disallows it. At the same time, 
the interpretation is disturbing in that it deprives clients of 
representation by lawyers in an area of the law that is complex, 
heavily regulated, and rife with risks. Largely for this reason, the 
State of Arizona’s Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct 
came to almost exactly the opposite conclusion than the one reached 
by the Maine Commission in an opinion issued in 2011, capturing the 
very troubling aspects of applying the traditional 1.2(d) approach to 
the representation of marijuana clients. The Arizona Ethics 
Committee held: 
[W]e decline to interpret and apply ER 1.2(d) in a manner that 
would prevent a lawyer who concludes that the client’s proposed 
conduct is in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with state law 
from assisting the client in connection with activities expressly 
authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of the very 
legal advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the conduct 
that the state law expressly permits. The maintenance of an 
independent legal profession, and of its right to advocate for the 
interests of clients, is a bulwark of our system of government. 
History is replete with examples of lawyers who, through vigorous 
advocacy and at great personal and professional cost to themselves, 
obtained the vindication of constitutional or other rights long denied 
or withheld and which otherwise could not have been secured.134 
A few things are notable about this opinion. First, it is explicitly 
premised on the language of the Ogden memo that those operating in 
“clear and unambiguous compliance” with state law are not an 
appropriate target of federal law enforcement. Given the change in 
federal enforcement following the issuance of the Cole memo, 
however, it is not at all clear that Arizona will continue to take the 
position that clear compliance with state law is a sufficient ground to 
insulate a lawyer from ethical sanction. Second, the Arizona holding 
is explicitly premised on access to law and a lawyer’s role (and duty) 
to provide services and help clarify the law: 
Legal services are necessary or desirable to implement and bring to 
fruition that conduct expressly permitted under state law. In any 
potential conflict between state and federal authority, such as may 
be presented by the interplay between the Act and federal law, 
lawyers have a critical role to perform in the activities that will lead 
to the proper resolution of the controversy. Although the Act may 
	
134 State Bar of Arizona, Formal Op. 11-01 (2011), available at http://www.azbar.org 
/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=710. 
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be found to be preempted by federal law or otherwise invalid, as of 
this time there has been no such judicial determination.135 
Finally, the Arizona opinion does not describe in detail what legal 
conduct is permitted and prohibited under the opinion. The opinion 
states that if a lawyer has properly instructed her client on the legal 
status of her conduct and the client has made an informed decision to 
engage in that conduct, “[t]he lawyer ethically may perform such 
legal acts as are necessary or desirable to assist the client to engage in 
the conduct that is expressly permissible under [Arizona law].”136 
What a lawyer ought to do in any given professional situation 
depends on the specific circumstances and, in particular, on the kind 
of assistance a lawyer is being asked to provide. 
The Arizona opinion rejects the Maine opinion’s mechanical 
reading of the terms “counsel to,” “assist,” and “discuss.” It points out 
that in a highly regulated society, discussing a course of conduct with 
a client is simply not enough to allow the client the ability to exercise 
her autonomy and decide what course of conduct to pursue, noting: 
“[l]egal services are necessary or desirable to implement and bring to 
fruition that conduct expressly permitted under state law.”137 
Accordingly, the Arizona Committee appears to allow counseling and 
assisting clients as long as their conduct is in “clear and unambiguous 
compliance” with state law. 
Yet such a broad reading is simply inconsistent with the traditional 
interpretation of Rule 1.2(d). Below we present a number of 
hypothetical situations, illuminating both the wide range of lawyer 
conduct implicated by the split between state and federal law in this 
area and the importance of treating that conduct in a nuanced way. In 
doing so, we propose a new reading of Rule 1.2(d) that provides 
coherent guidance in a variety of circumstances, and strikes an 
appropriate balance between respecting the objectives of Rule 1.2(d) 
and providing clients with meaningful access to lawyers in 
circumstances in which such access is most needed. 
B. A New Approach to Representing, Advising and Assisting Clients 
in the Commission of Crimes 
The inconsistency between the Maine and Arizona ethics opinions 
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knowledge and intent with regard to accomplice and coconspirator 
liability. Rather than the traditional reading of Rule 1.2(d), which 
looks to two elements, the client’s criminal conduct and the lawyer’s 
knowledge of that illegality, we suggest a reading of the Rule as 
consisting of three elements: (1) a client’s criminal activity, (2) a 
lawyer’s knowledge that the activity is criminal, and (3) a lawyer’s 
intentional assistance in the prohibited client conduct.138 
Principally, we argue, following Professor Pepper, that in a highly 
regulated society, first-class citizenship and the ability to act 
autonomously under the law require access to the law, and therefore 
to lawyers.139 Without the guidance of lawyers, lay clients would 
often be unable to ascertain the meaning and application of the law 
and would therefore be denied the ability to decide how to conduct 
themselves under the law in an informed manner. If lawyers were to 
face disciplinary charges for “assisting” clients whenever they merely 
know of the clients’ criminal conduct, lawyers would be inhibited 
from representing clients, and the ability of those clients to 
meaningfully direct their own conduct would necessarily be 
compromised. 
	
138 Section 94(2) of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers is entirely 
consistent with our proposed interpretation, stating in relevant part: “a lawyer may not 
counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be criminal . . . with the 
intent of facilitating or encouraging the conduct.” Restatement (Third) of Law Governing 
Lawyers § 94(2) (2000) (emphasis added). We concede that Model Rule 1.2(d) does not 
expressly incorporate the language of intent. Certainly one could argue that such a failure 
to reference intent suggests that intent ought not be read into the Rule. Some support for 
this contrary position can be found in ABA Formal Opinion 87-353: “as used in Rule 
3.3(a)(2), the language ‘assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client’ is not limited to 
the criminal law concepts of aiding and abetting.” ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353, at *4 (1997), available at http://omnilearn.net 
/ethics/pdfs/ABA_opinion87_353.pdf [hereinafter Opinion 87-353]. However, Opinion 
87-353 construed Model Rule 3.3, not 1.2(d) and the distinction is a significant one. In 
many ways, Rule 3.3 outlining disclosure duties to tribunals stands as an exception to the 
usual client-centered approach of the Rules. For example, sections 3.3(a)(3) and 3.3(b) 
constitute the only mandatory exceptions to the doctrine of confidentiality. MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2012). The Committee itself noted that its interpretation of 
Rule 3.3 was guided by the need to “protect against client perjury contaminating the 
judicial process”—a consideration irrelevant in the context of Rule 1.2(d). Opinion 87-
353, at *4. Put differently, one can consistently hold that in the context of Rule 3.3, 
disclosure of confidential information to a tribunal is warranted when a lawyer knows of a 
client’s perjury, even if the lawyer does not have the intent to assist the client, and still 
maintain that in other instances, such as Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is precluded from assisting a 
client only when the lawyer forms the necessary state of mind of intent to assist the client. 
139 See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, 
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 (1986). 
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The traditional interpretation of Rule 1.2(d) attempts to address this 
concern by permitting lawyers to discuss and explain the law to 
clients and draws the line at representation beyond such discussion of 
the law. But, as noted by Pepper, in many complex legal situations 
this conceptual distinction breaks down because, practically speaking, 
without the “assistance” of lawyers clients would not be able to 
pursue the conduct.140 Consider a client who wants to apply for a 
license to own and operate a medical marijuana dispensary. The 
application process is complex and detailed. If a lawyer is only 
allowed to discuss the process and the risks inherent in it, but 
prohibited from “assisting” clients in filling out an application, the 
practical reality will be denying clients the ability to apply for a 
license. 
We believe that when a state chooses to regulate particular 
conduct—in this case marijuana cultivation and sale—access to law 
and lawyers becomes a necessary aspect of implementing this policy 
decision. MMJ states have created a tangle of overlapping legal 
regimes where conduct is prohibited at the federal level, legal, but 
heavily regulated at the state level, and subject to zoning and other 
restrictions at the local level. In this instance, deference to client 
autonomy as well as respect for state sovereignty and principles of 
federalism compel a reading of Rule 1.2(d) that enhances client 
access to law and lawyers. Indeed, particularly in instances when the 
law is in flux, either because different states regulate certain conduct 
differently or because federal law and state law collide, clients need 
access to lawyers more than ever. Effectuating state policy thus 
commands that when a state imposes a regulatory regime upon certain 
conduct lawyers licensed within that state ought to be permitted to 
help clients pursue what the state has determined to be desirable 
conduct.141 
Access to law and lawyers in a highly regulated society is 
fundamental to the informed exercise of autonomy by clients. Yet 
deference to client autonomy is not the only important value lawyers 
serve.142 We believe that limiting client access to the law and to 
	
140 Pepper, supra note 129, at 1556–58. 
141 A more difficult case arises when a state chooses to criminalize conduct permitted 
by other jurisdictions or pursuant to federal law, if only because deference to client 
autonomy and respect of state sovereignty may in this instance point in different 
directions. 
142 David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639 (1986) (asserting that helping a client to do wrong is 
wrong regardless of the individual autonomy involved in the action). 
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lawyers is justified in the case of the more serious mala in se 
crimes—things like murder, rape, robbery and assault—but not in the 
case of mere mala prohibita crimes—crimes that are deemed bad 
merely because they are prohibited.143 In particular, we conclude that 
with regard to crimes like violations of the CSA that are mala 
prohibita, strong policy reasons support the reading of an intent 
requirement into Rule 1.2(d). 
Recall again, Lauria. In that case the court engaged in an elaborate 
analysis of when the defendant’s mere knowledge of the fact that he 
was facilitating criminal conduct would support a finding that he 
intended to facilitate that behavior. The court concluded that, on the 
facts before it, the defendant’s mere knowledge that some clients 
were using his services to engage in prostitution was insufficient to 
make him his clients’ coconspirator.144 But the court noted that a 
different situation might arise if the defendant were charged with 
conspiring to commit a more serious offense: “[t]he duty to take 
positive action to dissociate oneself from activities helpful to 
violations of the criminal law is far stronger and more compelling for 
felonies than it is for misdemeanors or petty offenses.”145 In other 
words, where the offense is more serious, it is less of an imposition to 
ask the provider of lawful services to avoid entangling herself in the 
misdeeds of her clientele. 
Courts have taken a similar approach with regard to accomplice 
liability. While a true intent is generally required before a defendant 
may be made another’s accomplice, this requirement is sometimes 
relaxed for more serious offenses. For example, in United States v. 
Fountain, Judge Posner wrote that a prisoner could be an accomplice 
to another prisoner’s killing of a guard even if the aid he provided 
could be described only as knowing: 
	
143 See Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1301, 1322 (1995) (“Before the advent of the Industrial Revolution some 150 years 
ago, the criminal law almost exclusively addressed conduct that was malum in se. 
Convictions for criminal offenses generally required proof of moral culpability, and the 
degree to which the criminal law was intertwined with society’s moral and religious values 
made such proof a substantially lighter burden for the prosecution than it would be 
today. But the Industrial Revolution created pressure on legislatures to pass mala prohibita 
regulations to protect citizens from the hazards of factory equipment, toxic chemicals, and 
other products of technological advancement. Lawmakers frequently made the violation of 
these regulations punishable as a criminal offense.” (citation omitted)). 
144 People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
145 Id. at 634. 
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Compare the following hypothetical cases. In the first, a shopkeeper 
sells dresses to a woman whom he knows to be a prostitute. The 
shopkeeper would not be guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution 
unless the prosecution could establish [her intent to aid]. Little 
would be gained by imposing criminal liability in such a case. 
Prostitution, anyway a minor crime, would be but trivially deterred, 
since the prostitute could easily get her clothes from a shopkeeper 
ignorant of her occupation. In the second case, a man buys a gun 
from a gun dealer after telling the dealer that he wants it in order to 
kill his mother-in-law, and he does kill her. The dealer would be 
guilty of aiding and abetting the murder. This liability would help to 
deter—and perhaps not trivially given public regulation of the sale 
of guns—a most serious crime. We hold that aiding and abetting 
murder is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
supplier of the murder weapon knew the purpose for which it would 
be used.146 
It is often difficult, however, to determine exactly where the line is to 
be drawn between those crimes for which the defendant’s knowledge 
makes her culpable and those for which true intent is required. While 
the Lauria court drew the line between misdemeanors and felonies, 
we believe a more sensible distinction is between those crimes that 
are mala prohibita and those crimes that are mala in se. This is a 
well-known distinction in the criminal law between more serious 
offenses whose uniform prohibition across societies indicates their 
inherent blameworthiness, and those less serious crimes—possession 
offenses and the regulation of vice more generally—about which 
reasonable minds can differ.147 Because possession of marijuana, 
particularly for medical purposes, is a bad thing merely because it is 
prohibited, we argue that an intent to facilitate such behavior is 
necessary in order for an attorney to be deemed to have engaged in 
unethical or criminal conduct. 
To be clear, note that this “access to law and lawyers” justification 
for requiring intent as a condition of finding attorney misconduct is 
somewhat different than the one advanced in criminal law. In Lauria 
the court required intent for fear of turning every merchant or 
purveyor of services into his brother’s, or customer’s, keeper; and due 
to the court’s discomfort with asking every shop owner to inquire into 
her client’s motives and plans.148 Attorneys do, however, in the 
ordinary course of providing legal services, inquire into clients’ plans, 
and sometimes into their motives as well. Yet exactly because 
	
146 United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798 (7th Cir. 1985). 
147 See Travers, supra note 143, at 1322. 
148 Lauria, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 635. 
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lawyers are so fundamental to the exercise of client autonomy in a 
highly regulated society and to clients’ ability to attain first-class 
citizenship as autonomous individuals, it is important that lawyers not 
become their clients’ keepers, and not act as their clients’ moral 
police officers. As a matter of public policy, to ensure the utmost 
client access to the law and to lawyers, the terms “counsel to” and 
“assist” in Rule 1.2(d) ought to be read to require a lawyer’s intent 
when the underlying client conduct entails mala prohibita crimes. 
A possible objection to our proposed reading of Rule 1.2(d) is that 
lawyers are simply different than the shopkeepers and merchants 
described in Lauria and Fountain. Above, we argue that lawyers 
should not be charged as accomplices and coconspirators—unless 
they form the intent to help their clients—because criminal 
prosecutions would undermine the attorney-client relationship and 
prevent lawyers from fulfilling the important and constitutionally-
sanctioned role they occupy in the criminal justice system.149 As 
professionals, however, shouldn’t lawyers be disciplined if they help 
clients when they have knowledge of the criminal conduct? Arguably, 
as members of a self-regulating profession, lawyers should not help 
their clients when they know that the clients’ conduct is criminal. 
In a classic essay on the meaning of professionalism, Roscoe 
Pound defined the term to refer to a group “pursuing a learned art as a 
common calling in the spirit of public service.”150 The Rules purport 
to capture this very meaning by summarizing the lawyer’s 
responsibilities as follows: “[a] lawyer, as a member of the legal 
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.”151 A gas station owner has no special responsibility 
whatsoever to maintain and protect the integrity of a system of buying 
and selling of gasoline. Rather, such an owner is only expected to sell 
an honest product at a fair price. By contrast, lawyers, as members of 
a self-regulating profession and officers of the legal system owe a 
special duty to uphold the rule of law, and as such ought not to help 
clients in conduct they know to be criminal. 
We argue, however, that the case for a higher mental state 
requirement is in fact more compelling in the case of lawyers than in 
the case of other providers of services and goods. Here, the argument 
	
149 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
150 ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). 
151 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). 
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goes beyond a concern about chilling the attorney-client relationship. 
Shopkeepers are not required to act as their brothers’ keepers because 
they often are not in a position to act in such a capacity. Lawyers, in 
contrast, are in position to act as their clients’ keepers but should not, 
because acting in that capacity will usurp the clients’ autonomy. 
Pursuant to the Rules, the client alone determines the objectives of the 
attorney-client relationship.152 It is only in instances when clients 
choose to pursue a course of conduct that entails mala in se crimes, or 
when attorneys form the intent to help clients that lawyers’ duty as 
officers of the legal system should trump their conflicting duty to act 
as representatives of clients. 
Some may argue that in the context of the attorney-client 
relationship lawyers always form the intent to help their clients. After 
all, lawyers are retained and paid to help clients. Since a successful 
and happy client makes for a happy and paid attorney, would not 
lawyers by definition of their job description form the intent to help 
their clients? While it is undoubtedly true that lawyers have an 
obligation to encourage respect for and compliance with the rule of 
law,153 finding that a lawyer “wished to bring about” criminal activity 
simply because she represented a client who engaged in that activity 
undermines a constitutive tenant of the attorney-client relationship—
the principle of non-accountability—pursuant to which “[a] lawyer’s 
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, 
does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s . . . activities.”154 
That is, while lawyers are retained to represent clients, they do not, by 
virtue of the representation, “endorse” or form the intent to help client 
pursue their goals. Nor should that intent be inferred from mere 
knowledge of clients’ goals and conduct. 
	
152 Id. at R. 1.2(a). 
153 Id. at R. 1.6 cmt 2. 
154 Id. at R. 1.2(b). On the principle of non-accountability, see Murray L. Schwartz, The 
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 672–75 (1978) 
(coining the term “Principle of Nonaccountability” to mean that lawyers are neither legally 
nor morally accountable for a client’s conduct); William H. Simon, The Ideology of 
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 40–41 
(1978) (explaining the legal system and the attorneys’ function within the system). While 
entrenched as a fundamental principle of law practice, non-accountability has long been 
criticized by leading legal ethics scholars. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 
148–49, 160–74 (1988); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19–64 
(Gerald Postema ed., 2007) (criticizing the principle of non-accountability for protecting 
lawyers from moral culpability for a client’s conduct) [hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 
AND HUMAN DIGNITY]. 
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Indeed, the practice of law often tolerates instances in which 
lawyers know of clients’ criminal conduct but are not required to 
abstain from offering legal services as a result. A criminal defense 
attorney, for example, may learn in the course of her representation of 
a client that the client is guilty of the crime with which he was 
charged. Rather than informing the prosecutor or the court, however, 
the defense counsel is expected to continue to vigorously defend that 
client.155 The expectation is grounded not in ignoring or belittling the 
gravity of the client’s conduct, but rather in allowing defendants the 
opportunity to defend themselves and holding the government to the 
standard of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.156 
Similarly, a defense attorney may, in the course of representation, 
come to know of her client’s ongoing or future criminal plans; 
however, the Rules never mandate disclosure of that information to 
the police or victim.157 Again, the point is not to ignore or endorse the 
client’s conduct; certainly lawyers are encouraged to attempt to 
dissuade a client from wrongdoing.158 Rather, the point is to 
acknowledge and respect the competing value of the sanctity of the 
attorney-client relationship, in which client trust in the attorney is a 
fundamental element—so much so that lawyers do not have a 
mandatory duty to disclose confidential information.159 These 
examples highlight the point that competing principles often 
overcome our intuition that lawyers ought not to assist those they 
know have committed, are committing, or will commit crimes. 
	
155 Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469–72 (1966). 
156 Id. at 1471. 
157 The only mandatory exceptions to confidentiality are disclosure meant to prevent 
fraud on the court in Rule 3.3(a)(3) and perjury in Rule 3.3(b). MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3), (b) (2012). Rule 1.6(b) enumerates six exceptions to 
confidentiality but none are mandatory, even in circumstances when the client’s future 
conduct involves “reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.” Id. at 1.6(b)(1). 
158 “A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of 
the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the 
representation . . . . This contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer 
relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate 
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject 
matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if 
necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without 
exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the 
complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, 
lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is upheld.” 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
159 Id. 
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What is more, a prosecutor often exercises her discretion and, 
notwithstanding her awareness of the extent of a defendant’s 
misdeeds, decides either not to charge her with any crime or to charge 
her with a lesser offense than her conduct merits.160 We do not 
consider the exercise of prosecutorial discretion a violation of the 
prosecutor’s duty as an officer of the legal system; rather, we 
acknowledge that competing policy considerations warrant the 
exercise of discretion and professional judgment. Indeed, federal 
prosecutors in 18 states and the District of Columbia who exercise 
their discretion and decide not to charge dispensary owners with 
violating the CSA know that the owners are guilty of a federal crime 
but choose nonetheless not to act on it. 
Finally, our proposed reading of Rule 1.2(d) is not inconsistent 
with an approach that takes lawyers’ role as officers of the legal 
system seriously. Prominent critics of the role of lawyers as mere 
“representatives of clients,” such as Professors Bill Simon and David 
Luban,161 object to lawyers’ zealous representation of clients only 
when such representation imposes injustice or indignity on third 
parties, and where lawyers, in response to the injustice indifferently 
assert no moral accountability for the client conduct they help bring 
about. Put differently, Simon and Luban call upon lawyers to act as 
“officers of the legal system” when failing to do so, and, in particular, 
assisting clients exercise their autonomy and pursue their goals, will 
result in harsh undesirable outcomes imposed on innocent third 
parties. For purposes of this Article, we need not take a position in 
this more theoretical discourse on the morality of lawyers and the 
possible tension between acting as a representative of clients and as 
an officer of the legal system. Suffice it to note that while our 
proposed reading of Rule 1.2(d) is justified in terms of providing 
clients with access to lawyers and the law such that clients can pursue 
their autonomy, the representation of marijuana clients does not in 
any way result in undesirable or unjust outcomes. Indeed, under our 
proposed reading, in instances when client conduct is morally 
undesirable, such as in mala in se circumstances, mere knowledge 
	
160 See generally Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal 
Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002). 
161 See generally LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 154; 
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). 
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rather than intent would suffice to preclude an attorney from helping a 
client pursue her criminal conduct.162 
In the sections that follow we apply this proposed reading of Rule 
1.2(d)—one that requires lawyer intent as an element of 
misconduct—in a number of contexts in which lawyers face the 
ethical and legal quandary of when and how they may assist 
marijuana clients. 
1. Lawyers’ “Personal” Conduct 
a. Lawyers’ Participation in Marijuana Programs 
An initial question regarding the involvement of lawyers with the 
marijuana industry has nothing to do with the lawyer’s role as advisor 
or advocate. Rather, it asks whether a lawyer violates her ethical 
obligations if she merely participates in a state’s MMJ program as a 
patient. Here, the relevant provision is not Rule 1.2(d) but Rule 
8.4(b), which generally governs attorney misconduct.163 In addition to 
prohibiting violations of the Rules, Rule 8.4(b) also governs an 
attorney’s “personal” conduct outside of her professional duties, 
stating that it constitutes misconduct for an attorney to “commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”164 Note that 
the Rule does not state that it is misconduct for the attorney to engage 
in any criminal conduct; only that conduct which reflects negatively 
on her trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer is deemed to be attorney 
misconduct. In the past this provision has been deemed violated by 
	
162 We do, however, acknowledge an important limitation of this “access to law and 
lawyers” policy consideration: it applies most forcefully to individual clients rather than to 
entity clients. That is, because entities are not capable of exercising autonomy in the same 
way that individuals do, one cannot justify greater access to law and lawyers to entity 
clients on the ground that it would allow these clients to exercise greater autonomy. 
Accordingly, while access to lawyers and autonomy support our proposed reading of Rule 
1.2(d) with regard to individual marijuana dispensary owners, they do not offer as 
compelling a justification for the representation of entities which own and operate 
marijuana dispensaries. On the other hand, in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, the Supreme Court held that corporations, like individuals, have First 
Amendment Rights and may make independent expenditures that advocate election or 
defeat of candidates. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010). Thus, although individuals may make a more compelling case for legal 
representation than can the entities they run, it does not necessarily follow that there is no 
public interest in entities receiving competent legal advice. 
163 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2012). 
164 Id. 
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crimes such as embezzlement, but not by others that do not pertain to 
a lawyer’s trustworthiness or fitness.165 
It should be noted that registering as an MMJ patient is not itself 
illegal conduct, even under federal law. What is prohibited under the 
CSA is the manufacture, sale or possession of marijuana. Thus, an 
attorney’s mere presence on a list of marijuana patients is, without 
more, neither the commission of an offense nor tantamount to an 
admission of criminal conduct—it permits the card-holder to purchase 
marijuana but it does not attest to the fact that they have in fact done 
so.166 It is only when the attorney takes the additional step of 
purchasing or growing marijuana in compliance with state law but in 
violation of the CSA that she first becomes subject to Rule 8.4(b). At 
this point, it becomes necessary to determine whether her violation of 
federal law constitutes misconduct. 
There are good reasons to conclude that violating federal law by 
becoming a patient in a state-sponsored MMJ program should not be 
deemed professional misconduct. First, possessory crimes, unless they 
indicate a dependence problem, are generally not deemed to invoke 
Rule 8.4(b).167 Second, while conduct involving alcohol and drugs 
has often been deemed grounds for misconduct, the typical fact 
pattern involves either additional wrongdoing—such as driving under 
the influence or providing clients with incompetent representation—
or otherwise displaying disregard for the law.168 Participants in MMJ 
	
165 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 675, 705–06 nn.105–10 (2003) (explaining that decisions regarding an attorney’s 
chemical dependency are “haphazard in their results—some recognizing chemical 
dependency as a mitigating factor, some treating it as an aggravating factor, other focusing 
on rehabilitation, and yet others ignoring the ramifications of the lawyer’s addiction 
altogether” (footnotes omitted)). 
166 State lists of patients are confidential. Thus, a lawyer will only be publicly 
associated with the marijuana registry if she announces her participation. See, e.g., COLO. 
CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(3)(a) (“No person shall be permitted to gain access to any 
information about patients in the state health agency’s confidential registry, or any 
information otherwise maintained by the state health agency about physicians and primary 
care-givers, except for authorized employees of the state health agency in the course of 
their official duties and authorized employees of state or local law enforcement agencies 
which have stopped or arrested a person who claims to be engaged in the medical use of 
marijuana and in possession of a registry identification card or its functional equivalent, 
pursuant to paragraph (e) of this subsection (3).”). 
167 However, some jurisdictions have imposed discipline for mere possession. See 
Zacharias, supra note 165, at 705–06 nn.105–10. 
168 Donald H. Stone, The Disabled Lawyers Have Arrived: Have They Been Welcomed 
with Open Arms Into the Profession? An Empirical Study of the Disabled Lawyer, 27 LAW 
& INEQ. 93, 108–11 (2009). 
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programs who are in compliance with state law, however, are not 
engaged in additional wrongdoing and their conduct does not harm 
others. Finally, Rule 8.4(b) is usually invoked in instances where 
lawyers publically conduct themselves in a manner that displays 
dishonesty or lack of trustworthiness, such as violating clients’ trust, 
not with regard to private conduct such as the discreet consumption of 
MMJ. Bolstering this reading of Rule 8.4(b), the Colorado Bar 
Association Ethics Committee has determined that the violation of the 
CSA by a lawyer-patient who is in compliance with state law is not in 
itself a violation of Colorado’s ethical rules. The committee read 
Colorado ethical rules as requiring a “nexus between the violation of 
law and the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or the fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects.”169 Therefore, we conclude that as a general 
matter participation in an MMJ program as a patient does not violate 
Rule 8.4(b). For the very same reasons, it is hard to see how attorney 
participation in recreational marijuana programs in states that permit 
them would violate Rule 8.4(b). 
b. Lawyers’ Financial Participation in the Marijuana Industry 
Related to the question of whether a lawyer may participate in a 
state’s MMJ or MJ industry is whether she may do so as an investor 
in or owner of a marijuana business. This would seem to present a 
much closer case that likely constitutes misconduct under Rule 8.4(b). 
An attorney-patient who believes that marijuana is a useful medicine 
for her own condition and a lawyer-consumer of recreational 
marijuana are differently situated from a lawyer-investor in a 
marijuana dispensary.170 
The question then becomes whether ownership of a dispensary in 
violation of federal law amounts to criminal conduct that reflects 
adversely on one’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. 
Because, as we have seen, fitness as a lawyer includes fidelity to the 
law and public disrespect for the law has been acknowledged as 
	
169 Colorado Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 124 (2012), reprinted in COLO. LAWYER, July 
2012, at 28 (citations omitted), available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl_articles.cfm 
?articleid=7626. 
170 Ample case law establishes that Rule 8.4(b) covers a lawyer’s private conduct 
outside of the practice of law. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 5 
(2012) (“A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.” 
(emphasis added)); see also id. at R. 8.4(b). Therefore, the fact that ownership of a 
dispensary has nothing to do with an attorney’s law practice does not negate liability under 
the Rule. 
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grounds for discipline, it seems apparent that a lawyer may not own 
or invest in a marijuana business. Furthermore, in contrast to 
membership on a list of approved MMJ patients—which is inherently 
private conduct—ownership of a marijuana dispensary is inherently 
public; the ownership of marijuana dispensaries is generally a matter 
of public record. Thus, an attorney’s participation in the industry as a 
dispensary owner is law-breaking of a different kind and could 
subject the attorney to discipline under Rule 8.4(b) and criminal 
prosecution under the CSA.171 
2. Permissible Legal Services 
When we turn from a lawyer’s personal conduct to her conduct as 
an attorney, we see that any general statement regarding the 
representation of those in the marijuana industry is likely to be 
inaccurate. Rather, a careful analysis of what services a lawyer is 
asked to provide and why she chooses to provide (or not provide) 
those services becomes necessary. 
a. Criminal Defense 
One of the services that lawyers are asked to perform for those in 
the industry is criminal defense for those prosecuted under either state 
or federal marijuana laws. A literal reading of the ethical and criminal 
provisions might lead to a finding that an attorney providing zealous 
criminal defense, knowing that her client was guilty and would 
commit future crimes, violates both the criminal law and her ethical 
obligations.172 But this simply cannot be right. It is in direct conflict 
	
171 Note that the lawyer’s criminal liability in this context is direct rather than relying 
on application of the accomplice or coconspirator doctrines described above. 
172 See, e.g., Green, supra note 102, at 358 (“A lawyer who wages a vigorous defense, 
knowing that the criminal conspirators are seeking to secure his client’s release, might 
seem thereby to become a co-conspirator himself, since he is acting with knowledge of the 
conspiracy and in furtherance of one of its aims. Indeed, one might say that the lawyer 
intends to further one of the conspiracy’s objectives, although the reason that this is so is 
that his own objective as a defense lawyer simply happens to coincide with this objective 
of the conspiracy. The lawyer’s knowledge of the criminal conspiracy and his intent to join 
generally will not be proven directly, but circumstantially from proof of the facts made 
known to the lawyer and the lawyer’s conduct. Once it is inferred that the lawyer acted 
with criminal intent, all his otherwise lawful acts, such as investigating the case for trial or 
filing motions, would seem to become acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.”) For Green, 
as for us, such a result is intolerable. He concludes: 
[C]ourts should require clear statutory language before interpreting a criminal 
provision to reach lawyers’ professional conduct, at least where the conduct 
comprises traditional advocacy in accordance with a plausible construction of the 
professional norms and the line between innocence and guilt therefore turns 
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with the clear constitutional right of a defendant to the effective 
assistance of counsel in preparing a defense. A reading of either the 
rules of professional conduct or of the criminal law that would so 
directly infringe on an attorney’s capacity to represent her client 
would raise serious constitutional concerns. Thus, a lawyer can 
always, consistent with both her ethical and criminal obligations, 
provide criminal defense to a client acting pursuant to state marijuana 
laws who is charged with violating the CSA.173 
b. Political Advocacy and Lobbying 
Relatedly, lawyers often make an argument for legal change on 
behalf of their clients. They may argue that current law, either as 
written or as interpreted, is unjust, nonsensical, or otherwise ill-
considered. This argument can occur in the courtroom, the court of 
public opinion, or before the legislature.174 When such advocacy is 
made in a good-faith effort to determine the validity and application 
of the law, it is explicitly permitted by Rule 1.2(d);175 thus, a lawyer 
may always provide to a client lobbying and related legal services 
aimed at convincing state and federal legislators to amend statutes to 
legalize MMJ and MJ. Indeed, recall that while general representation 
	
exclusively on the lawyer’s intentions, which a jury can determine only 
inferentially. 
Id. at 388. 
173 In a sense, attorneys representing marijuana clients charged with violating the CSA 
are easiest to defend because their clients acted pursuant to state law. Accordingly, we 
need not opine in detail on two more problematic categories of whether it is appropriate 
for a criminal defense attorney to represent clients accused of crimes in circumstances in 
which the client did not act pursuant to the law, for example, murder or rape (we think the 
answer is yes); and whether it is appropriate for a lawyer to represent clients for the 
purpose of enabling criminal conduct, for example acting as an advisor to organized crime 
(we think the answer is no). See Fred Z. Zacharias, Practice, Theory and the War on 
Terror, 59 EMORY L.J. 333, 336 n.8 (2009); People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986) 
(disbarring an attorney acting to promote illegal client conduct); see also infra notes 185–
90 and accompanying text. 
174 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s 
situation.”); id. at R. 5.7 cmt. 9 (“A broad range of economic and other interests of clients 
may be served by lawyers’ engaging in the delivery of law-related services. Examples of 
law-related services include providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust 
services, real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, 
psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or environmental 
consulting.”). 
175 See supra Part III.A. 
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of marijuana clients, for example negotiating a commercial real estate 
lease, does not likely constitute a “good faith effort to determine the 
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law,”176 lobbying 
services do squarely fall within the purview of Rule 1.2(d) as efforts 
to ascertain the meaning of the law. 
c. Advising Clients Regarding the State of the Law 
Discussing with a client the consequences of a particular course of 
conduct is never a violation of Rule 1.2(d), even under the traditional 
interpretation.177 An attorney is clearly allowed to advise a client that 
owning and operating a dispensary is permitted pursuant to state law, 
that a licensing scheme exists, and that federal law prohibits the 
conduct.178 A lawyer may advise a client that owning and operating a 
marijuana dispensary is a violation of federal law, that a violation of 
federal law may lead to the filing of federal criminal charges against 
the client and a conviction, that a criminal trial as well as a 
subsequent appeal may serve as an arena from which one could 
challenge both the law and the public opinion of it, and that if charged 
with a federal crime one will be able to secure representation in both 
the trial and the appellate stages. Of course, an attorney would also 
have to advise the client about the possibly severe consequences of a 
criminal conviction, the costs of defending the charges and appeals, 
and the possibility of losing the legal battle. 
3. Questionable Legal Services 
A number of other instances pose harder questions under Rule 
1.2(d): May an attorney help a client in filling out application forms 
for a marijuana dispensary license pursuant to the state regulatory 
scheme? May an attorney help a client by negotiating a lease for a 
commercial space out of which the client will operate a medical 
marijuana dispensary? Draft the lease agreement? Draft purchase and 
sales agreements to be used in the course of doing business at the 
dispensary? Advise, negotiate, and draft employment contracts for 
dispensary employees. Pursuant to our proposed reading, a lawyer 
	
176 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d); supra notes 127–28 and 
accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
178 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in 
Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 671 (1981); Pepper, supra note 
129, at 1588–98. 
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may ethically provide these legal services without violating Rule 
1.2(d), as long as she does not form the intent to assist the client. 
a. Compliance Work 
May an attorney assist a client in pursuing a dispensary license 
pursuant to the state regulatory scheme? On the one hand, holding a 
license to own and operate a dispensary appears to constitute a 
necessary step toward the commission of a future federal crime in 
violation of the CSA. Thus, it could be argued that a lawyer providing 
legal services in such a context is assisting in conduct that she knows 
to be criminal, in violation of Rule 1.2(d). 
Our suggested interpretation, in contrast, would require an 
attorney’s intent before precluding her from helping clients obtain 
state licenses to own and operate dispensaries. The policy analysis we 
presented above in support of our reading is most compelling in the 
context of compliance work. Because state law creates a regulatory 
licensing scheme to which clients are entitled to apply, denying 
clients the assistance of counsel triggers questions of access to law, 
lawyers, and legal services. Particularly with regard to regulatory 
compliance—which is often complicated, byzantine, and requires an 
awareness of the interaction of federal, state, and local law—denying 
marijuana clients access to legal services has the effect of 
counteracting the policy goals represented by state marijuana laws. 
Helping clients with compliance work does necessitate, however, 
further analysis of the difference between knowledge and intent, 
namely, the circumstances under which attorneys’ intent can be 
inferred from their knowledge of the marijuana crime. Once again 
borrowing from criminal law, we believe that usually there is no 
reason to read the lawyer’s awareness of the client’s illegal conduct as 
being tantamount to intent to facilitate that conduct.179 Assuming that 
the attorney merely provides the same services to her marijuana 
clients that she does to her other business clients, for example, filling 
in the necessary paperwork to obtain a license—and charges no more 
for doing so than she does her other clients—she has not acquired a 
stake in the illegality of the venture and there is no cause to equate her 
knowledge with intent. Thus, a business attorney who merely 
provides the same services to marijuana practitioners that she does to 
the rest of her clients at the same rates does not in our minds run afoul 
of Rule 1.2(d). 
	
179 See People v. Lauria analysis, supra notes 87–93, 144–49, and accompanying text. 
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A more complicated case is presented by firms that cater 
exclusively or primarily to marijuana clientele.180 In such a case, the 
health of the firm is inextricably tied to the success of clients who are 
engaged in violations of federal law. Furthermore, a lawyer who 
presents herself to the world as offering legal services exclusively to 
those in violation of federal law comes dangerously close to offering 
services for which there is no legitimate legal use, as well as to 
showing disrespect to the law.181 Like the publisher of an advertising 
flier consisting entirely of prostitute listings or the tout who provides 
nothing but information on illegal gambling,182 the provider of 
services to marijuana businesses—and only marijuana businesses—
toes dangerously close to the sort of entanglement with illegal 
conduct that both the criminal law and the rules of ethics specifically 
prohibit. 
b. Contract Work 
May an attorney assist a client by negotiating a lease for a 
commercial space out of which the client will operate a marijuana 
dispensary? Draft the lease agreement? Draft a purchase and sales 
agreement to be used in the course of doing business at the 
dispensary? Advise, negotiate, and draft employment contracts for 
dispensary employees? As with compliance work, we believe the 
answer to these questions comes down to the lawyer’s state of mind. 
As long as a lawyer charges marijuana clients rates similar to those 
charged of non-marijuana clients for negotiating leases, drafting 
agreements, and advising regarding employment issues, and 
otherwise keeps a sufficient distance between her individual success 
and that of her client, the lawyer does not possess the requisite state of 
mind—intent—to satisfy the assist requirement per Rule 1.2(d). 
4. Prohibited Legal Services 
May an attorney introduce a client, A, who is a medical marijuana 
dispensary owner to another client, B, who is a medical marijuana 
grower for the purpose of having client A purchase marijuana from 
	
180 At least one such firm briefly existed in Colorado. Perhaps for the reasons discussed 
in this paragraph, however, it has since reorganized as a general-purpose law firm. 
181 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (citing as 
examples of services for which there is no lawful purpose a wire service that provided only 
gambling information, a publication containing only the names and contact information of 
prostitutes, and the provision of marked cards and loaded dice to casinos). 
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client B? What if the sale would take place pursuant to state rules that 
allow licensed dispensary owners to buy a certain percentage of the 
marijuana they sell to patients from another source? 
Attorneys often introduce business clients to each other to create 
synergies for clients and to generate business for themselves. Indeed, 
experienced lawyers’ role as reputational intermediaries is a 
significant and growing one, especially in the global market for legal 
services.183 However, we believe that such attorney conduct violates 
Rule 1.2(d) when carried out in the context of the marijuana industry. 
By taking an active role in the transaction—by providing the 
necessary connections to make it happen—the attorney has done more 
than disinterestedly provide legal services in connection with the sale. 
He has, in the words of Learned Hand’s famous requirement, “in 
some sort associate[d] himself with the venture, that he participate[d] 
in it as in something that he wishe[d] to bring about, that he [sought] 
by his action to make it succeed.”184 Unlike the lawyer who merely 
helps a client draw up a lease or an employment agreement, now the 
attorney is actively involved in trying to grow the business for two of 
her clients. Whether he is paid a percentage of the transaction or is 
doing the work on an hourly basis, the attorney is no longer 
sufficiently detached from the sale. Indeed, even if the lawyer is not 
explicitly paid for making the introduction, acting as an intermediary 
in these circumstances violates Rule 1.2(d). He no longer merely 
knows that her conduct will facilitate the sale of marijuana; he 
actively hopes that it will do so. His clients’ happiness—and thus his 
own—hinges on his ability to make the violation of federal law 
happen. While the lawyer writing the lease is largely indifferent 
whether drugs are sold on the premises, the lawyer arranging the sale 
needs the sale of drugs to occur. His mens rea is thus one of intent and 
he violates his ethical obligations—and opens himself to criminal 
prosecution—when he assists his clients in this way. 
To be clear, the takeaway from our proposed interpretation of Rule 
1.2(d) is not that lawyers are free to represent marijuana clients 
without any limitations. Rather, it is that lawyers may represent 
	
183 John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International 
Business Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 38–41 (2007); Christopher J. 
Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism: Global Law Practice Means Business, 27 PENN 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 465, 466 (2008). 
184 See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). The Hand formulation 
was subsequently referenced by the United States Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. 
United States, 336 United States 613, 619 (1949); see supra notes 75–77. 
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marijuana clients as long as they do not form the intent to help their 
clients violate the CSA. Put differently, lawyers may not represent 
marijuana clients when they intend to help their clients pursue 
criminal conduct. People v. Morley, a Colorado Supreme Court case, 
nicely demonstrates the boundaries of permitted representation under 
our reading.185 Morley was charged with assisting a client pursue the 
criminal conduct of prostitution.186 Prostitution is generally regarded 
as a mala prohibita crime, and accordingly, pursuant to our proposed 
reading, Morley could only be deemed to have violated Rule 1.2(d) if 
he formed the requisite intent to assist his client.187 The court found 
that: 
 [Morley] refused [the client’s] offer of a financial interest in the 
proposed venture and stated that all his work for the organization 
would be billed as legal work. [But h]e discussed with [the client] 
the importance of setting up a code system for the women, 
commented on the dangers of using an out-of-house computer 
service, and stated that putting the initial money to fund the 
operation in [his] trust account rather than a bank account would 
assure [the client] a degree of anonymity with respect to his role in 
the scheme. After commenting on the method used to screen the 
women employed in the scheme, [Morley] cautioned [the client] 
against advertising and the use of pimps. No definite agreement was 
reached on a fee, although [Morley] did mention to [the client] that  
. . . he would require a $1,000 retainer. After the scheme was 
outlined, [Morley] told [the client] he would consider different ways 
in which to put the service together and would make some contacts. 
At this meeting and in later conversations, [Morley] also advised 
[the client] about various ways to structure the proposed activity in 
order to avoid problems with local law enforcement agencies. 
 [Morley subsequently] arranged for [the clients] to meet [a local 
prostitution ringleader] at dinner . . . The following day . . . 
[Morley] again met with the [clients] and proposed that he be paid a 
fee of $5,000 for providing the organization with contacts . . . It was 
agreed . . . that [Morley] would provide additional contacts and that 
he would receive $1,500 payable in two to three weeks with the 
balance of $2,500 payable once the prostitution business was in 
operation. [Morley] kept a record of his meetings with [the clients] 
	
185 People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986). 
186 Id. at 513, 519. 
187 Morley was charged not with violating Rule 1.2(d) but rather with the then 
applicable DR 7-102(A)(7), pursuant to which a lawyer may not “counsel[] or assist[] a 
client in conduct that the [lawyer] knew to be illegal.” Id. at 513–14. Morley’s “clients” 
were not actual clients but in fact federal agents engaged in a sting operation. Id. at 513. 
To simplify the facts of the case, because the court found that Morley believed the agents 
were his clients and that he formed an attorney-client relationship with them, we refer to 
the agents as Morley’s clients. 
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on a ledger sheet titled in [the client’s] name. [Morley] entered 
these meetings on the ledger sheet as conferences with “clients.”188 
The court held that: 
[Morley] knowingly counseled what he believed was an illegal 
prostitution scheme, and he actively pursued participants for that 
purpose. [Morley’s] misconduct was nothing short of a calculated 
effort to assist others in this ostensibly illegal enterprise, was 
undertaken over a considerable period of time for his own profit, 
and could not have been accomplished without an egregious 
disregard of basic professional ethics.189 
Morley was disbarred.190 Our proposed reading would similarly find 
a grave violation of Rule 1.2(d) on these facts. As the quote from the 
court’s findings demonstrates, the attorney in question clearly formed 
the intent to assist the client. Morley did not merely help the clients 
apply for a license for an escort service, negotiate a commercial real 
estate lease, or draft employment contracts. Rather, he helped disguise 
the criminal activity, offered services for which no legitimate legal 
use existed, charged his clients for services he did not offer non-
prostitution clients, and, per our discussion above of prohibited legal 
services, charged clients for introducing them to others for the very 
purpose of pursuing further criminal activity. Morley’s conduct 
illustrates that lawyers can, and unfortunately sometimes do, form the 
intent to assist a client in criminal conduct. When they do, they are 
violating Rule 1.2(d) and ought to be sanctioned to the fullest extent. 
C. May a Lawyer Ever Assist a Client in the Commission of a Crime? 
In the previous section we argued that an attorney may generally 
provide legal services for marijuana clients without running afoul of 
her ethical obligations or the constraints of the criminal law. In 
particular, we proposed a reading of Rule 1.2(d) pursuant to which a 
lawyer can generally help marijuana clients with most of their legal 
needs and does not assist clients so long as she does not form the 
intent to counsel to or assist her clients’ criminal conduct. Because we 
construe the term assist to require intent to help clients, pursuant to 
our proposed reading of Rule 1.2(d), lawyers can often help clients 
without assisting them, but may never assist clients in the commission 
of a crime. 
	
188 Id. at 512–13. 
189 Id. at 518–19. 
190 Id. at 519. 
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As we have seen, however, the traditional approach to Rule 1.2(d) 
is very different, essentially prohibiting lawyers from offering legal 
services to marijuana clients. Under the traditional approach, may a 
lawyer ever help a marijuana client pursue criminal conduct in 
violation of the CSA? Put differently, given a reading of Rule 1.2(d) 
that prohibits lawyers from representing marijuana clients, may a 
lawyer ever intentionally choose to violate Rule 1.2(d)? Scholars of 
legal ethics agree that as officers of the legal system, lawyers have a 
prima facie duty to obey the law, including the rules of professional 
conduct which are, after all, binding state law. Some scholars even 
argue that while all citizens have a duty to obey the law, lawyers have 
a heightened duty to do so.191 However, in order to demand attorneys’ 
obedience, the law in question must be just, or at least not unjust.192 
Are marijuana laws so unjust as to warrant a lawyer’s violation of 
Rule 1.2(d) as construed by the traditional approach? 
1. Unjust Laws 
In the MMJ context, federal law criminalizing the conduct of MMJ 
practitioners might be considered unjust because some MMJ patients 
suffer from ailments for which marijuana proves to be a useful 
medicine. Client conduct that is meant to improve access to MMJ for 
those who would benefit from its medical properties can thus be seen 
as both legitimate and just, particularly when such conduct is 
consistent with state law and policy. Federal law can similarly be seen 
as unjust to the extent that it precludes the operation of MMJ 
dispensaries by owners with the primary intention of providing access 
to customers in pain and in need. Accordingly, one could argue that 
lawyers assisting such clients would be helping their clients violate an 
unjust law and might be morally justified in doing so, notwithstanding 
the technical violation of Rule 1.2(d) and subsequent discipline. 
This line of reasoning is contradicted by two MMJ realities. First, 
as we have seen from the exponential growth in the number of 
“patients” in Colorado and other states following the issuance of the 
Ogden memo,193 there is reason to believe that a substantial number 
of these users are primarily recreational, not medical. Second, many 
dispensary owners enter the MMJ market for profit, rather than for 
	
191 See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have 
a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 270, 293–94 (1996). 
192 See William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
217, 217–18 (1996); Wilkins, supra note 191, at 269–72. 
193 See Ogden Memo, supra note 49, at 9. 
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ideological reasons. If the client’s primary rationale is making a 
profit, not providing access to medical patients in pain, the “unjust 
law” rationale for violating federal law loses its currency. Put 
differently, if a lawyer’s assistance is based on a sincere desire to help 
increase access to medicine and on the desire of some clients to 
address the needs of their patients, the lawyer will be better positioned 
to justify violating Rule 1.2(d) and invoke the law’s unjust 
characteristics as a reason for the violation. But since the motivation 
of many clients appears to be profit maximization, they (and 
subsequently their lawyers) cannot in good faith claim to have 
violated the law (and Rule 1.2(d)) because it is unjust.194 In short, it 
seems clear that marijuana laws, while perhaps erroneous,195 are not 
unjust. We hope that our proposed reading of Rule 1.2(d) is adopted, 
such that the Rule is not deemed violated in the majority of marijuana 
representations. However, in jurisdictions that continue to follow the 
traditional interpretation, a lawyer may not justify a violation of Rule 
1.2(d) on the ground that the criminal law she assists the client in 
breaking is unjust. 
Yet can the “access to law and lawyers” reasoning we use to justify 
drawing the distinction between knowledge and intent in construing 
Rule 1.2(d) also be employed to justify violations of that Rule? 
Again, in jurisdictions that adopt our proposed interpretation, such an 
argument would be unnecessary because Rule 1.2(d) would not be 
violated in most instances of marijuana representation. In jurisdictions 
that continue to the follow the traditional interpretation of Rule 1.2(d), 
	
194 Just as many clients wish to enter the MMJ arena to make money rather than to 
provide medical access to patients, many lawyers wish to represent these clients not 
because of an ideological commitment to helping clients, but rather because representing 
MMJ clients is a means of making a living in a highly competitive legal services market. 
The focus on a lawyer’s motivation is not unusual in evaluating the appropriateness of a 
lawyer’s conduct: Rule 7.3, for example, draws a similar distinction in assessing a 
lawyer’s in-person solicitation of clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 
(2012). If the solicitation is driven primarily by “the lawyer’s pecuniary gain,” then it is 
disallowed, but if the primary reason is ideological commitment to the client’s cause, then 
in-person solicitation is generally allowed. See id. at 7.3(a); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Association, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437-39 (1978). One 
could argue analogously that if a lawyer’s primary motivation for serving an MMJ client is 
a pecuniary one, then a lawyer is not justified in violating Rule 1.2(d) on the grounds that 
the underlying law is unjust; by contrast, if the lawyer’s primary motivation is ensuring 
access to patients in pain and in need, then the violation of Rule 1.2(d) may be morally 
justified. 
195 See, e.g., Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enforcement Agency, No. 11-1265 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2012) (lawsuit challenging the DEA’s refusal to re-categorize 
marijuana from Schedule 1). 
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however, lawyers could use the “access to law and lawyers” rationale 
as a justification for their decision to “assist” marijuana clients. Of 
course, a lawyer violating Rule 1.2(d) on principled grounds will 
nonetheless be subject to discipline.196 Our point, to be clear, is not 
that lawyers violating Rule 1.2(d) should be exempt from disciplinary 
action. Rather, we argue that in jurisdictions that follow the traditional 
interpretation that limits marijuana clients’ access to lawyers, a 
lawyer could attempt to justify her conduct and seek a reduced 
sanction on the ground that her conduct was meant in good faith to 
help clients exercise their autonomy. 
2. Justice and Equality under the Law 
The marijuana scenario, however, does provide an illuminating 
example of the possible discriminatory consequences of denying 
clients access to the law and lawyers. The traditional approach to 
construing Rule 1.2(d) to prohibit lawyers from assisting clients 
pursue marijuana endeavors practically means that relatively 
unsophisticated clients with little knowledge of the law, and, in 
particular, of how to navigate the complex marijuana regulatory 
permitting scheme, will not be able to pursue their marijuana 
objectives.197 Sophisticated clients, on the other hand, will be able to 
engage in the same conduct without the assistance of lawyers. In other 
words, interpreting Rule 1.2(d) to preclude attorneys from assisting 
marijuana clients raises questions of equal access and distribution of 
access among different types of clients. Clients hailing from higher 
socioeconomic classes, as well as the more educated and affluent, are 
likely to fare better than others. 
Similarly, some marijuana clients may be powerful enough to get 
lawyers to assume the risk of violating Rule 1.2(d) and assist them, 
resulting in further inequalities of access. Consider a well-to-do real 
	
196 In this sense a marijuana lawyer is not unlike a medical marijuana practitioner. The 
Supreme Court has held that in a prosecution under the CSA, a defendant’s assertion that 
he was manufacturing or distributing marijuana for medical purposes is strictly irrelevant 
to his guilt. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Collective, 532 U.S. 483, 489–
95 (2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a legally cognizable defense under the 
CSA). A lawyer’s motive for violating Rule 1.2(d) is thus like a criminal defendant’s 
motive for violating a criminal statute; it cannot absolve him of responsibility, but it can be 
relevant in the determination of an appropriate sanction. 
197 See, e.g., Steve Elliott, Colorado Medical Grower Bartkowicz Gets 5 Years In 
Prison, TOKE OF THE TOWN (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:31 PM), http://www.tokeofthetown.com 
/2011/01/colorado_medical_grower_bartkowicz_gets_5_years_in.php (as a result of a plea 
bargain, Chris Bartkowicz is serving five years for growing 224 marijuana plants for 
medical marijuana patients); supra note 65. 
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estate entrepreneur who owns several commercial properties and who 
has a stable relationship with a midsize or large law firm. The 
entrepreneur approaches the law firm seeking advice about leasing 
commercial real estate space to an MMJ dispensary. The law firm is 
concerned about the potential violation of Rule 1.2(d) but is eager to 
keep the entrepreneur as a client. It either decides to advise the client 
and assume the risk of disciplinary enforcement for violation of Rule 
1.2(d), or it refers the case to another lawyer, perhaps one still 
developing her client base who is not likely to pass up the referral, 
keeping the client advised and content. Either way, the client ends up 
being represented in negotiating the lease with the MMJ entrepreneur-
tenant. The tenant, on the other hand, may be unable to secure 
representation. Consequently, the well-off real estate owner is more 
likely to end up with the better end of the deal. 
Recall that in jurisdictions that would follow our proposed 
interpretation, Rule 1.2(d) would usually not be violated by an 
attorney’s representation of marijuana clients. However, in states that 
continue to follow the traditional interpretation, lawyers may consider 
violating Rule 1.2(d) and offering legal services to marijuana clients 
that suffer inequality and injustice by being denied access to law and 
lawyers while other, more powerful and privileged clients, benefit 
from the guidance of lawyers. Once again, a lawyer violating Rule 
1.2(d) on principled grounds will nonetheless be subject to discipline. 
However, the lawyer could attempt to justify her conduct and seek a 
reduced sanction on the ground that her conduct was designed to 
mitigate the discriminatory and unfair impact of the marijuana laws 
on less powerful and privileged clients. 
D. Enforcement of Criminal Law and Discipline 
We have not yet considered whether state regulatory agencies 
should seek to discipline attorneys who represent marijuana clients. If 
regulation counsel believes that lawyers are helping clients in 
violations of the CSA, surely disciplinary action is called for. Recall 
that Rule 1.2(d) states in relevant part that “a lawyer shall not counsel 
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows 
is criminal.” In prohibiting counsel and assistance to criminal 
conduct, Rule 1.2(d) does not distinguish between conduct that is 
criminal pursuant to state law and conduct that is criminal pursuant to 
federal law. A federal crime is a crime in every state jurisdiction, 
meaning that a lawyer who counsels or assists a client in criminal 
conduct that violates criminal federal law is violating the rules of 
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professional conduct in her state, and a state regulatory agency should 
enforce its own rules of professional conduct. As should be clear by 
now, however, we believe that regulation counsel generally ought not 
to discipline attorneys for helping marijuana clients. In a majority of 
cases, Rule 1.2(d) is simply not going to be violated by attorney 
conduct in this area because it will rarely be the attorney’s intent to 
aid her client’s criminal conduct. 
Moreover, even if our proposed interpretation of Rule 1.2(d)— 
requiring attorney intent to aid the client as opposed to mere 
knowledge of the criminal conduct—is rejected, state disciplinary 
agencies should still refrain from enforcing Rule 1.2(d) against 
lawyers who help marijuana clients. Having established a legal 
apparatus legalizing medical and recreational marijuana, the state 
should be estopped from then seeking to discipline lawyers who help 
clients operate within the confines of that same apparatus. Put 
differently, as long as the regulation and discipline of lawyers 
continues to be state-based, a state and its disciplinary agency should 
be estopped from sanctioning lawyers who help clients in conduct that 
is permitted by state law. 
It should be noted that such an approach by state regulatory 
agencies may open the door to attempts by the federal government to 
regulate and discipline marijuana attorneys. If state regulatory counsel 
fail to discipline lawyers who brazenly “assist” clients flout federal 
law, federal officials may feel compelled to intercede and regulate 
lawyers’ conduct themselves. Indeed, outside of the marijuana 
context, the federalization of legal ethics has been a growing 
phenomenon. An ever-increasing number of federal agencies have 
acted in recent years to regulate lawyers appearing and practicing 
before them,198 and it is not inconceivable that the DEA, for example, 
may join the trend and attempt to regulate MMJ lawyers.199 But it is 
	
198 Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 124, at 124–28. 
199 On the other hand, many of the federal agencies that have recently moved to 
regulate lawyers’ conduct have a more convenient and obvious arena in which to regulate 
attorneys. Securities attorneys, for example, regularly appear and practice before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. See Rhonda McMillion, ABA and Other Bar 
Groups Work to Limit Federal Regulation of Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 2010, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/let_the_states_do_it_aba_working_to_limit 
_federal_regulation_of_lawyers/; George A. Riemer, SEC v. State Bars?, OR. ST. B. 
BULL., Dec. 2003, at 21, available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/03dec 
/barcounsel.html. Tax attorneys routinely appear and practice before the IRS. See Jay 
Miller, Protected Thoughts? IRS Threatens Attorney Work-Product Doctrine, WIS. LAW., 
Oct. 2011, at 13, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section 
=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=107382. MMJ 
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unlikely. The federal agencies that have recently began or stepped up 
their efforts to regulate the conduct of lawyers appearing and 
practicing before them have done so under a clear direction from 
Congress. The DEA has no such mandate and experience suggests 
that if the DEA purported to regulate lawyers without such authority, 
it should expect harsh opposition from the practicing bar.200 
Finally, if regulation counsel were to attempt to discipline 
marijuana lawyers pursuant to the traditional interpretation of Rule 
1.2(d), a lawyer’s good faith assertion that she violated the rule in 
order to enhance client autonomy or avoid discriminatory 
consequences for under-privileged clients should be taken into 
account as a mitigating factor, at least in the sanctions stage of the 
disciplinary process.201 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal law pays relatively little attention to the practice of law. 
Like everyone else, criminals who happen to be lawyers should be 
prosecuted. But attorneys have generally been insulated from criminal 
liability for the actions that they take representing their clients. And 
by and large this is the right result. Compelling policy reasons such as 
	
attorneys, in contrast, would not be in anyway appearing or practicing before the DEA, so 
an attempt by the federal government to regulate MMJ attorneys would have to entail 
some creative maneuvering to establish jurisdiction. Yet in the new world of the 
federalization of legal ethics, one should not be too quick to rule out the possibility of 
federal regulation of MMJ lawyers, especially in the absence of meaningful state 
regulation. 
200 See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: 
Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 
665, 704–07 (1995). Without regulatory disciplinary action against marijuana lawyers at 
the state level (per our proposed interpretation of Rule 1.2(d)) and at the federal level (no 
clear authority for the DEA to do so), should federal prosecutors seek to charge marijuana 
attorneys criminally as accomplices or coconspirators under the CSA? We believe not, for 
the two reasons discussed above. First, lawyers in most circumstances lack the intent 
necessary to be liable as accomplices or coconspirators. Second, because of the likely 
significant chilling effect of charging lawyers as accomplices on the attorney-client 
relationship, prosecutors ought to defer to disciplinary agencies and allow them to take the 
lead role in regulating lawyers’ professional conduct. This outcome, to be sure, does not 
amount to giving lawyers a free pass at aiding and abetting violations of criminal law. If 
lawyers form the necessary intent they could be charged as accomplices and 
coconspirators and should certainly be disciplined for violating Rule 1.2(d). 
201 To be clear, regulation counsel should only refrain from disciplining marijuana 
lawyers for helping marijuana clients. Of course, if marijuana lawyers otherwise engage in 
professional misconduct and violate the rules of professional conduct, for example, by 
charging marijuana clients unreasonable fees, regulation counsel should discipline such 
misbehavior just as it would any other lawyers. 
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protecting the attorney-client relationship from intrusion by 
prosecutors suggest that criminal law ought to defer to legal ethics 
and the disciplinary apparatus when it comes to the regulation of 
lawyers. As a result, marijuana lawyers, like all lawyers, generally 
should not fear criminal prosecution for engaging in the practice of 
law. 
The traditional interpretation of the pertinent rules of professional 
conduct, on the other hand, treats marijuana lawyers as both outlaws 
and crusaders. By disallowing most marijuana-related representations, 
legal ethics renders marijuana lawyers outlaws who engage in 
professional misconduct and therefore are subject to discipline. At the 
same time, it regards these lawyers as crusaders who may pay an 
imposing professional price for their commitment to serve clients in 
need of legal representation.  
Marijuana lawyers, however, are neither outlaws nor crusaders. 
Rather, like most other lawyers, they are simply trying to strike an 
effective balance between their role as representatives of clients and 
their role as officers of the legal system. Borrowing from accomplice 
and coconspirator liability in criminal law, our proposed 
interpretation of applicable rules of professional conduct, which 
prohibits helping clients in relatively minor criminal conduct (mala 
prohibita) only when the lawyer intends to assist the conduct, would 
allow marijuana lawyers to strike an appropriate balance between 
their competing roles by permitting them to help marijuana clients 
with the majority of their legal needs. 
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